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Abstract
The Russian Federation  has  one of the richest natural  owns most of the natural  resources,  which theoretically
resource endowments  in the world.  Despite  their  facilitates change in resource pricing and taxation.
importance  in the  Russian economy,  natural resources  do  Second,  the cost of adjusting the tax system is relatively
not contribute  as much as they could to public revenues.  low at this time since  Russian  tax policy is  undergoing
Large resource  rents (excess  payments,  or above-normal  thorough  reform.
profits generated  by natural resources in scarce  supply)  Increasing  rent taxation  should be  relatively
are dissipated  through subsidies and wastage,  or  straightforward  since  the system  already  exists.  What
appropriated  by private  interests. Failure  to tax this rent  mainly needs to be done is to differentiate  the  fees to
means that taxes  must be levied  elsewhere  (on capital  reflect  objective rent-generating  conditions by
and labor)  to sustain  revenues, thereby  depressing  withdrawing the rent and  imposing higher taxes  on
investment and employment,  or that potential  revenues  profitable resource  deposits. A seemingly  desirable
are foregone.  Failure  to reinvest  rent means that Russia  instrument-true  differentiation  of rental  payments-
perpetuates the tradition  of exporting  low value-added  does  not exist in Russia  despite legislative provisions  that
raw materials and excessive capital outflows,  and retards  it should. Several  natural  resource  taxes are specific  taxes
its transition  to sustainable  economic  development.  (set per volume),  regardless  of the market price or
Bosquet provides estimates  of the average  and total  production  cost.  Such taxes favor profitable deposits anld
current rent on crude  oil, natural  gas, and round wood  in  penalize  marginal  ones.
Russia.  The sum of appropriated rent on oil and gas was  The  author's  study should be given serious
estimated at US$9  billion in 1999  (in  excess of $15  consideration  in the renewed debate  on tax reform  and
billion in 2000), or about  18  percent of consolidated  tax  in the context  of Russia's  structural reform  program.  It is
revenues.  The appropriated rent on round wood  was  in line with the proposals of the new governmental
estimated  at US$191-1,032  million.  economic  strategy,  particularly with boosting  the share
A more appropriate  natural resource  taxation  system  of natural  resources in  generating revenue  and reducing
would  enhance  the fiscal  role  of natural  resources as well  income  tax rates. The extra  advantage  to rent taxation
as create better incentives  for resource  conservation  and  and revenue  recycling is that it would  allow the
environmental protection.  Two conditions further  government  to lower the tax burden  without leading to a
reinforce the appeal of such a reform.  First, the state still  budget deficit.
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1.  Russia  has  one  of the  richest  natural  resource  endowments  in  the world.  It  is the
largest producer of natural gas, the third largest producer of crude  oil and one of the principal
sources  of many  minerals,  such  as  coal,  gold,  diamonds  and  ferrous  metals,  as  well  as
biological  resources  such  as  timber  and  fish.  Despite  their  importance  in  the  Russian
economy,  natural  resources  do  not  contribute  as  much  as  they  could  to  public  revenues.
Large  resource  rents  (excess  payments,  i.e.  above-normal  profits  generated  by  natural
resources in scarce supply) are dissipated  through subsidies and wastage and/or appropriated
by private interests.  Failure to tax this rent means  either that taxes must be  levied elsewhere
(i.e.,  on  capital  and  labor)  to  sustain  revenues  thereby  depressing  investment  and
employment,  or  that  potential  revenues  are  foregone.  Failure  to  reinvest  rent means  that
Russia perpetuates  the traditions  of exporting  low value-added  raw materials  and excessive
capital outflows, and retards the transition to sustainable economic development.
2.  A more appropriate natural resource  taxation system would enhance the fiscal role of
natural  resources  as  well  as  create  better  incentives  for  resource  conservation  and
environmental protection.  Two conditions further reinforce the appeal of such a reform.  First,
the state still owns most natural resources,  which theoretically facilitates  changes in resource
pricing and taxation. Second, the cost of adjusting the tax  system is relatively low at this time
since Russian tax policy is undergoing a thorough reform.
3.  Technically,  increasing  rent taxation  should be  relatively  straightforward  since the
system  already  exists.What  mainly needs  to  be  done  is  to  differentiate  the  fees  to  reflect
objective rent-generating  conditions.
4.  It should be given very serious consideration in the renewed debate on tax reform  and
in the context of Russia's structural reform program. Indeed, it is in line with the proposals of
the new governmental  economic  strategy,  in particular with respect to boosting the share of
natural resources  in revenue  generation  and reducing  income tax  rates.  The  extra advantage
of rent taxation  and revenue  recycling  is that they would allow the government to lower the
tax burden without affecting the budget deficit.
5.  Recent  regional  experiments  may  show  the  way  forward.  In  the  Komi  Republic,
forest  stumpage  fees  have been raised  to better reflect  and  capture  the timber rent.  Samara
Oblast  has  differentiated  natural  resource  user  fees  to  capture  part  of rental  incomes  on
mineral resources. Following in Komi's footsteps,  the Northern territories  have declared their
intention  to  differentiate  all  natural  resource  payments.  Finally,  Yaroslavl  Oblast  is
developing  a  cadaster  of its  resource  base  designed  to  value  and  price  resources  more
adequately.  A similar experiment is taking place in the Vologda region.
6.  The  Government  is  aware  that  natural  resources  are  inadequately  taxed  and  has
proposed  that  the  public  finance  role  of rental  payments  should  be  enhanced  and  these
payments should be differentiated according to the amount of potential rent.7.  This  report  provides  estimates  of the average  and  total  current  rent  on  crude  oil,
natural  gas  and  round  wood.  For  each  of these  resources,  a  large  fraction  of the  rent  is
unrealized,  meaning it is  dissipated  through  economic  inefficiencies  (subsidies  and waste).
The remainder of the rent, which is realized,  consists of normal profit (the  entrepreneurial
rent), rent captured by taxes, and excess profit (the appropriated rent).
8.  Regarding  crude  oil,  the  average  current  rent  was  estimated  at US$  95  per ton  in
1999,  which  broke  down  into  42%  unrealized  rent  (subsidies  to  the  Russian  and  other
Commonwealth  of Independent  States  economies),  17%  normal  profit  (assuming  a 20%
return on equity), 25% tax take, and  15%  appropriated  rent (assuming transfer pricing). This
amounts to an annual total appropriated  rent on crude oil of US$ 4.5 billion in  1999 (US$  12
billion in 2000).
9.  Regarding natural  gas, the average  current rent in  1999 was estimated  at US$ 55 per
thousand cubic meters, breaking down into 66% unrealized rent (subsidies to the Russian and
CIS  economies),  4% normal profit (assuming  a  15%  return  on equity),  16%  tax  take,  and
14%  excess  profit.  This  amounts  to  a  total  appropriated  rent  on  natural  gas  of US$  4.6
billion per year.
10.  The sum of appropriated  rent on oil and gas was estimated  at US$  9 billion in 1999
(in excess of $15 billion in 2000), i.e. about  18% of consolidated tax revenues.
11.  Regarding  round  wood,  the  average  rent  in  1999  was  estimated  at  US$  17-24  per
cubic meter (depending on the data set used), which  is made up  of 41-57% unrealized rent
(subsidies to the Russian economy),  7-10% normal profit (assuming a 20% return on equity),
20-23%  tax take,  and  11-33%  excess  profit.  This would mean  a  total appropriated  rent  on
round wood of US$ 191-1,032 million per year.
12.  Unrealized  rent,  inadequate withdrawal  of rent  and misuse of the rent  that has been
withdrawn  (due  to  irresponsible  public expenditure  programs)  all  represent  some  form  of
misuse of public resources.
13.  Improving natural resource taxation should follow the principle of differentiation,  i.e.
withdrawing the rent by imposing higher taxes on resource deposits that are more profitable.
A seemingly  desirable  instrument,  true  differentiation  of rental payments  does not  exist in
Russia - in  spite of legislative  provisions  that  it should.  Several natural  resource taxes  are
specific  taxes  (set per volume),  regardless of market prices or production  costs.  Such taxes
favor  profitable  deposits  and  penalize  marginal  ones.  Instead,  they  should  attempt  to
withdraw the rent.
14.  Russia being a federation,  it would be crucial that any proposed tax  shift from capital
and  labor  to  resource  rents  be  acceptable  to the  region(s)  where  the  natural  resources  are
located but also to the  federal government, through whose budget interregional  equalization
takes place.
15.  A  final  consideration  is  the  volatility  of primary  commodity  prices.  This  hampers
shifting taxes from capital and labor to natural resource rents, since rent fluctuates along with
commodity prices.  In a  highly volatile  context,  a system  primarily based  on rent extraction
iimay  be  characterized  by revenue  instability.  If a total  substitution  of rental payments  for
other taxes  is thus unlikely,  the  government  can still extract the rent when it is present  and
cut taxes on capital and labor accordingly.
iiiI.  INTRODUCTION
Overview  of Current Tax Structure
1.1  Like most countries,  Russia collects tax revenues  from three bases - labor, capital and
natural  resources.  Table  1 gives  the  shares  of the  main  revenue  categories  in  the  1999
consolidated  and federal budgets.'
Table 1.  Russia's  1999 Budget Revenues
Consolidated budget  Federal budget
Share  mn RUB  mn US$  Share  mn RUB  mn US$
Total revenues  100%  1,197,454  48,284  100%  611,710  24,666
Tax revenues  83.7%  1,002,606  40,428  83.3%  509,507  20,545
CPT  18.4%  220,207  8,879  13.3°/o  81,201  3,274
PIT  9.8%  116,940  4,715  3.3%  19,928  804
VAT  24.0%  286,894  11,568  36.1%  221,031  8,913
Excise taxes  9.1%  108,416  4,372  13.8%  84,212  3,396
Licenses  0.1%  1,620  65  0.1%  689  28
Foreign currency tax  0.2%  2,467  99  0.2%  1,450  58
Sales tax  1.6%  19,293  778  0.0%  0  0
Othertaxes  0.0%  11  0  0.0%  1  0
Imputed income tax  0.6%  6,936  280  0.2%  1,259  51
Property taxes  4.4%  52,600  2,121  0.1%  749  30
"Green taxes"  3.7%  44,575  1,797  1.7%  10,496  423
Foreign trade taxes  7.2%  86,262  3,478  14.1%  86,262  3,478
Other taxes  4.7%  56,386  2,274  0.4%  2,228  90
Non-tax revenues  6.9%  82,583  3,330  7.7%  47,010  1,896
Transfers  1.3%  15,051  607  0.0%  9  0
Budget funds  8.1%  97,214  3,920  9.0%  55,183  2,225
Source:  Ministry of Finance.
1.2  Taxes  on  income  (including  corporate  profits  and  personal  income),  goods  and
services  (including  VAT  and excises),  and foreign trade  (import and export  duties) together
make up about 70% of consolidated revenues.  The concentration of the revenue capacity in a
few taxes is even more marked  at the federal  level, where the same  five taxes provide some
80% of revenues.
1.3  Table  2  breaks  down  the  total  revenues  from  natural  resource  and  environmental
taxes  into  the  various  constituent  parts.  Green  taxes,  i.e.  natural  resource  user  fees  and
pollution charges, make up less than 4% of consolidated revenues,  and less than  2% of total
federal revenues.  They provide  more  at the sub-national  (regional  and local) level,  namely
' The consolidated  budget  is the  sum of the  federal  and sub-national  budgets  of the members  of the Russian
Federation (provinces,  autonomous republics, etc.)just over 5%. By far the most  important natural  resource  user fees and environmental  taxes
are  the subsoil  user  fees (see  the definitions  in Table  4).  Land  tax  revenues  generate just
under  1%  of consolidated  revenues2,  while  forest fees  come  third with  less than  0.15%  of
consolidated  revenues.  The share of pollution charges  accruing to the budget is  even more
marginal  as  it  provides  less  than  0.05%  of revenues.  Although  these  revenue  categories
represent  slightly larger  shares  of the regional budgets, the amounts  are low in comparison
with the top five revenue categories mentioned above.
Table 2.  Natural Resources and the Environment in Russia's 1999 Budget
Consolidated  budget  Federal budget
Share  mn  RUB  mn US$  Share  mn RUB  mn US$
Total revenues  100%  1,197,454  48,284  100%  611,710  24,666
Total "green taxes"  3.72%  44,575  1,797  1.72%  10,496  423
Subsoil user fees  2.51%  30,077  1,213  1.18%  7,190  290
Continental shelf  0.00%  25  1  0.00%  0  0
Forest fees  0.14%  1,727  70  0.07%  447  18
Water fees  0.09%  1,035  42  0.03%  198  8
Pollution charges  0.04%  461  19  0.08%  461  19
Land tax  0.91%  10,939  441  0.36%  2,189  88
Other user fees  0.03%  312  13  0.00%  10  0
Other revenues  96.28%  1,152,878  46,487  98.28%  601,214  24,242
Source: Ministry of Finance.
1.4  Of course,  natural  resources  generate  more budget  revenues  than  suggested  by the
single item "green  taxes" of Table  1 and Table  2. Natural  resources  also  generate revenues
indirectly via profit taxes, excises, VAT, export duties, etc.  Table 3 reports the contributions
of the  main natural  resource  sectors  to  the revenues  collected  by the Ministry of Taxation.
Out  of the  tax  revenues  collected  by the  Ministry  of Taxation  in  1999,  four  of the main
natural resources - namely fuels, metals, wood and fish products - contributed  around 20%,
including over 17% from fuels and metals  alone. This proportion  is much larger than the 4%
of total  consolidated  revenues  due  to natural  resource user  fees.  And this is  not the whole
picture.
1.5  Table  3  does  not  contain  the  revenues  collected  by  the  Customs  Committee
(Gostamozhkomitet), which is responsible for levying import and export duties, as well as the
excises  on  exported  oil  (about  one-third  of  the  oil  produced).  For  exarnple,
Gostamozhkomitet reports  collections of RUB  39 bn (around US$  1.5 bn) in export duties in
1999,  i.e.  over  3% of consolidated  budget  revenues.  Indeed  around  80%  of export  duties
2 Land taxes produce  relatively large revenues,  although large land users  (e.g.  the firm Gazprom) pay no land
taxes  for most of their production and transport installations (Voronkov 2000b).
2were  due  to  natural  resources,  including  oil  products  (51%),  ferrous  metals  (13%),  wood
products (7%), and copper (5%) (Kaulbars 2000).3
Table 3.  Estimated tax collections by the Ministry of Taxation in 1999
(based on first 9 months)
Total  Tax revenues accruing to the federal budget
CPT  VAT  Excises  User fees
mn  %  mn  %  mn  %  mn  %  mn  %
RUB  Share  RUB  Share  RUB  Share  RUB  Share  RUB  Share
Total  760,757  100  70,960  100  138,513  100  69,410  100  8,725  100
Fuels  92,945  12.2  8,412  11.9  10,401  7.5  9,052  13.0  5,046  57.8
Oil  62,357  8.2  6,987  9.8  6,411  4.6  4,317  6.2  3,272  37.5
extr.
Oil ref.  12,044  1.6  825  1.2  846  0.6  3,774  5.4  81  0.9
Gas  12,588  1.7  421  0.6  2,211  1.6  954  1.4  1,316  15.1
Coal  4,864  0.6  112  0.2  682  0.5  0  0.0  67  0.8
Metals  38,274  5.0  79,996  11.3  -4,042  -2.9  14  0.0  1,513  17.3
Wood  13,649  1.8  1,997  2.8  1,523  1.1  21  0.0  260  3.0
Fish  2,843  0.4  372  0.5  446  0.3  6  0.0  5  0.1
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
1.6  The total contribution of natural resource sectors  to tax revenues under current policy
is  thus  very  substantial.  There  are,  however,  two  issues  to  be  raised  with  the  current
approach  to  taxation  of these  income  streams.  First,  except  in  the  category  of natural
resource user fees, which represent a small fraction of total Taxation Ministry collections,  the
contribution of natural resource sectors to tax revenues is indirect, to the extent that it is not
the  resources  themselves  that  generate  the  tax  revenues,  but  the  value  added  to  these
resources.  Taxes  on profit, social security  contributions  and excises may burden the capital
and labor applied to natural resources.
1.7  Second, failure to capture much of the rent potentially available puts the sustainability
of these tax revenues  in doubt. This latter issue will become more critical as some of Russia's
reserves  become  scarcer.4 Of course  some  of the  appropriated  rent  could  be  reinvested
directly  into  productive  uses  without  transiting  through  the  budget,  but  this  is  far  from
guaranteed.  Russia indeed suffers from massive  capital outflows,  which is largely associated
with  natural  resources,  for  example  through  underrepresented  export  earnings  (Fisher  and
Sahay  1999; Loungani  and Mauro  2000). Flight capital  probably is not reinvested in Russia
in the short term.
3  Such export  duties are an effective  way of capturing excess profits  since they vary with world  market prices
and  world market  prices  are  not  influenced  by  Russian  producers.  Nevertheless  they  are  not pure  taxes  on
excess profits and distort the allocation of resources between exports and domestic  sales by penalizing exports.
4According  to BP Amoco,  at the present rate  of extraction,  Russia  has 22  years  left of oil in the  ground (BP
Amoco  1999). Beyond absolute scarcity, the remaining oil becomes progressively  more expensive to extract.
31.8  According to the government's strategy for economic growth,  the "aim of tax reform
is not to collect more taxes and thereby solve the problem of the budget crisis, but ...  (1)  to
reduce the size of the tax burden  as the state's obligations  ...  decrease;  (2) to make Russian
tax policy fairer toward taxpayers whose economic conditions differ;  (3) to raise the level of
neutrality of the tax  system toward the economic decisions of firms and consumers."  (GOR
2000,  146)  Other problems  associated  with the Russian  tax system  include non-compliance
and non-cash payments,  both of which have been the topic of a growing literature (see, e.g.
Alexeev  1998; Aslund 1998; Herzog  1997; OECD 1999; Pinto et al. 2000; Pirttila 1999).
1.9  These problems,  and others  associated with them,  in particular  capital  flight,  would
be  alleviated if natural  resource  rents were  taxed  appropriately,  especially if the  collected
revenues  served to finance  a partial and gradual tax  shift occurred from capital  and labor to
natural  resources.  Specifically,  using  natural  resource  rents  as  tax  base  facilitates  tax
assessment  (calculating  rent  is  easier  than  defining  and  assessing  "income"),  legitimizes
taxation (rent is unearned income), and is less distortionary than income taxes.
Natural Resource  Rent and Its Measurement
1.10  One way of ensuring  that benefits  for the  nation  continue  to  flow  from  its natural
resource  is  to  capture  and  reinvest  resource  "rents".  In this  report,  "rent"  is defined  as
follows:
"Rent  is  a  surplus  - the  difference  between  the price  of a good  produced  using  a
natural resource and the  unit costs of turning that natural resource into the good. The
unit costs include the value of the labor, capital, materials, and energy inputs used to
convert the natural resource into a product. What remains after these factor inputs are
netted  out  is  the value  of the  natural  resource  itself - the  land,  water,  . . .,  fish,
minerals,  forests, and environmental  resources such as air and water."  (Hartwick and
Olewiler  1998,  59)
1.11  Consider  the  following  hypothetical  example:  the market  price  of a resource-based
commodity  is  US$  100,  its  production  cost  (ie.  the  operating  cost  of production  plus
depreciation)  is US$  50,  and a norrnal  (competitive) profit needed to remunerate  capital  is
US$ 10. The residual value, or economic rent, is $40. If the raw resource (say round wood) is
not exchanged  as  such, the reference  market price  may be that of a processed  commodity
based upon the resource (say sawn goods or plywood).
1.12  Production  cost  can  be  either marginal  or average.  Using  average  production  costs
overestinates  the  real  rent,  however,  since  average  costs  are usually lower  than  marginal
costs,  given that  marginal  costs  tend to  increase  as  a  function  of quantity.  Nevertheless,
average cost data are more readily available,  so average  costs are often used in calculations
of rent.
1.13  Theoretically, rent should be estimated in an intertemporal framework  (Boadway and
Flatters  1993)  but the  data  necessary  to  carry  out  such  an  analysis,  in particular  reliable
discount and inflation rates  and marginal cost and revenue  stream  estimates,  are not always
available.
41.14  Ideally, rent is best observed and captured through competitive auctions.  However,  in
the  absence  of such  auctions,  the  government  needs  to  rely  on  appraisal  techniques  to
estimate the rent, and on taxes to capture it.
1.15  Determining  normal  profit  can  be  controversial.  Theoretically,  normal,  or
competitive,  profit is the opportunity  cost of allocating  one's resources  to  a specific  activity
as  opposed  to  another,  in  other  words  the  profit  that would  be  recorded  in the  next  best
alternative.  Assume  that  an  agent  has  the  choice  between  investing  in  natural  resource
extraction and manufacturing, having equal access to and knowledge of both industries. If the
agent  achieves  a  10%  rate of return  in resource  extraction,  while he could  achieve  15%  in
manufacturing, the  normal profit,  or opportunity cost of extracting natural resources,  would
be  15%.  In this case,  the agent  foregoes profit.  If, instead,  the profit in resource extraction
were 20%, the agent achieves more than the opportunity cost of manufacturing, which is still
the  next  best alternative  to  resource  extraction.  The difference  can  now  be  called  excess
profit. In a perfectly competitive  market (perfect  information, no barriers to entry, etc.) more
firms would enter the natural extraction business to compete down this excess profit to zero.
In a non-competitive  market, actual profits may stay above competitive  profits. In the case of
natural resources, which are in relative scarcity, this excess profit is called economic rent.
1.16  Practically,  normal profit may be thought of as the return  on a risk-free asset, plus  a
premium related  to the  investment  risk involved  in a  given  economic  activity.  A high-risk
project would  thus  entail  a  high premium  and  a high  normal profit.  In  a  natural  resource
project, the residual profit above that would be considered  economic rent. If  possible,  normal
profit can be broken down into  short-term normal profit (a competitive  return on short-term
assets,  or  working  capital,  needed  in  production)  and  a  long-term  normal  profit  (a
competitive return on long-term assets).
1.17  Potential rent is not the same thing as realized rent. For rent to be maximized, in other
words  for realized  rent  to be equal to potential  rent, there must be no rent dissipation.  For
instance,  in  the  case  of  wood  resources,  illegal  harvesting  and  environmental  damage
constitute resource  waste and rent dissipation.  Figure  1 shows  how potential  timber rent is
used and dissipated. The same logic applies to most every natural resource.
1.18  The rent appropriated  by actors along the  forestry chain (all the way from the logger
to the final customer) is theoretically much lower than the potential forest rent. The potential
forest rent  is the inherent  residual  value of the  forest  given a perfectly  competitive  market
and efficient  technology.  Neither condition  is ever completely  met,  resulting  in part of the
potential rent being unrealized, i.e.  dissipated. The market is never perfectly competitive  due
to  the  existence  of  market  failures  (monopoly  power,  transaction  costs,  imperfect
information,  negative  externalities,  etc.),  and  technology  is  at  least  somewhat  inefficient
(there is always  some  material waste in the harvesting and  processing links of the  forestry
chain).  The  environmental damage of logging also  detracts  from  the  value of present  and
future harvests.  Silvicultural rent may arise from less-than-optimal  forest management  rules.
Finally, high grading ("cutting the best and leaving  the rest")  causes the loss  of potentially
economic timber.
51.19  Of the rent  that is realized, only  a fraction  is recorded, the rest being  lost to illegal
activities. Ultimately, the recorded rent can be divided into three components:  the part that is
captured  by the government in the form of forest revenue (sometimes called forest taxes); the
part that is the  forest  enterprises'  normal (competitive) profit to  remunerate  capital;  and the
part that is appropriated by forest and other enterprises  as excess profit. This residual value is
called stumpage value. The government may decide to assess the stumpage value and attempt
to capture it through a variety of fiscal or forest management instruments.
The Taxation of Rent
1.20  Taxing  rent  offers  several  advantages  from  a  public  finance  perspective.  Rent  is
price-determined  as opposed to price-determining:  rent does not enter  production  costs  and
does  not  determine  value.  Given  that  the  price  of the  resource  or  the  resource-based
comnmodity is given by the competitive market, not driven by the tax on rent, and given that
the tax still allows  for cost recovery and  a competitive  rate of return,  taxing rent is neutral
with respect to economic activity.  Since pure rent taxes  are neutral,  they are said to be non-
distortionary.  On  the contrary,  taxes  on capital  and labor do influence  economic  activity as
they tend  to  deter  people from  working  and  firms  from  investing,  which  is  why they  are
called  distortionary.  The  idea  of neutrality  adopted  here  is  that,  beyond  the reduction  in
disposable  income  itself,  a  tax  should  not  alter  decisions  on  consumption,  production  or
trade, nor the ordering  of consumption,  production  and trade  options (Gamaut  and Clunies
Ross,  1979).
1.21  A pure  tax  on rent withdraws  the excess  profit  and  is purely  price-determined.  As
such, it does not distort economic decisions, which also implies that it cannot give any price
incentive to consumers for more rational resource  use or pollution abatement.  The  pure tax
on rent has been discussed by various authors,  including  Gamaut and Clunies Ross  (1975).
Other taxes can help withdraw the rent by taxing the use of the rent-generating factor,  e.g. a
mineral  resource,  fish landings,  or water pollution.  Such taxes  withdraw the rent,  not from
the firm's bottom  line, but through  higher costs of production,  which are price-determining.
Consequently,  these  taxes  can  no  longer be viewed  as purely  non-distorting.  On  the other
hand, they do create price incentives for more rational resource use or pollution abatement.
1.22  More generally, rent capture produces its primary benefits  in terms of efficiency  and
equity  of  the  tax  system.  From  a  classical  efficiency  point  of  view,  it  facilitates  tax
assessment since the base for rental payments  is easier to define  than "income."  Sources  of
income may not be known, and income tax  legislation typically includes many loopholes  and
clauses  giving  rise  to  "tax  engineering,"  so  that  income  can  be  hidden  or  sheltered.  In
contrast, it is difficult to hide or shelter a natural resource,  and taxing rent makes it possible
to remove  some of the existing distortions due to taxes on capital  and labor. From an equity
point of view, it enables the current and future generations to benefit from a collective  good,
the quantity and quality of which cannot be significantly improved by man's intervention.
1.23  Taxing  away the  rent  may  also  help  to prevent  or  moderate  the  "Dutch  disease,"
which  is  the  expansion  of the natural  resource  sector  benefiting  from  a  windfall  (e.g.  an
increase  in  oil  prices)  and  the  contraction  of  other  sectors  producing  tradable  goods.
Following  such  a  favorable  shock,  if income  is  consumed  rather  than  saved,  a  resource
6movement effect occurs:  factors  of production  are  drawn towards the booming sector  away
from the non-resource producing  sectors.  In addition, a spending effect takes place  whereby
higher  incomes  also  stimulate  the  demand  for  non-tradable  goods.  As  a  result,  the  real
exchange  rate,  defined  as  the  price  ratio  of  non-tradable  to  tradable  goods  Pn /IP,
appreciates.  With  a higher real  exchange  rate,  qualitatively  superior  imports  are substituted
for  domestic  production.  Both  these  effects  combine  to  hurt  the  non-resource  domestic
tradable goods sectors (Gelb  1988).
1.24  The benefits of capturing rent extend even beyond the efficiency and equity of the tax
system. With respect to exhaustible resources,  withdrawing and investing rent is a condition
of long-term  sustainability.  The "Hartwick rule"  states that if investment in produced capital
just equals current  rents on the exhaustible resource  at each point in time, then the resulting
path for the economy  is one where welfare  equals a maximal  constant value ad infinitum -
one definition of sustainability.5 In other words,  for each subsequent  generation to enjoy the
same  consumption  level per capita, all  scarcity  rents  of exhaustible  resources  must  be
reinvested in man-made  capital, technical knowledge,  etc., and none consumed by the current
generation  (Hamilton  1995,  1999;  Hartwick  1977; Hartwick  and Olewiler  1998; Tietenberg
1  992).6
5  This definition of sustainability refers  to "weak  sustainability."  In this version, a given level of welfare  can be
maintained  by  substituting  man-made  capital  for  natural  capital.  In  the  "strong  sustainability"  version,  by
contrast,  a threshold stock of natural capital would need to be preserved to sustain the diversity of the origins of
welfare.
6  Apropos  of renewable  resources,  the  rule  is that  a resource  is managed  sustainably,  in other  words  is not
depleted,  if it is in steady  state, i.e. if withdrawals  equal reproduction.  Steady state requires  that all inputs  into
production  be  set  at  the  appropriate  level:  in the  case  of wood  production,  trees  themselves  should  not  be
overharvested,  the  quantity  and quality  of man-made  harvesting  capital  should  be  kept up,  and  the human
population consuming wood products should be stationary (Hartwick and Olewiler  1998).
7Figure  1: From potential to appropriated forest rent
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8II.  NATURAL RESOURCE TAXATION  IN RUSSIA:  CURRENT SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Overview
2.1  Russia's  current  system  of natural  resource  and  environmental  taxes  consists of the
main items  listed  in Table  4.  Various  payment  types  exist, including  natural  resource  user
fees,  pollution charges,  consumer taxes  on  energy,  and prices paid  to  acquire public  assets
such  as land. At their current level, natural resource  and environmental  taxes cannot provide
real incentives  for rational  resource management  nor capture economic  rents (OECD  1999).
Mineral resources provide a case in point.
Table 4.  The Russian System of Natural Resource and Environmental  Taxes7
Type of payment  Description
1. Subsoil user fees
1.1  Rental payment  Annual payment  for carrying out  exploration activities, set
per unit of subsoil area  used and determined  as a function
of the geographical  features and size of the subsoil area, the
type of fossil resources, the  duration of activities, the level
of geological  study of the  subsoil  area,  and the perceived
degree of risk. Equal to  1-2%  of surveying and assessment
costs.
1.2 Royalty  The rates,  set as percentage  of the sales value of extracted
minerals,  vary  between  1%  for  low-grade  ferrous  metals
and  underground  waters  and  16%  for  high-grade  oil  and
natural  gas.  For oil  and gas,  the range is 6-16%.  The  fees
for gold and diamonds  range from 4 to  10 and 4 to  8%  of
sales  value,  respectively.  Payment  is  to  be  made  by the
investor in cash or in kind.
1.3  Payment for  Depletion  (severance)  tax,  set at  10%  of the  sales price of
replacing the mineral  minerals,  designed to  finance  geological  exploration.  Also
base8 called geological  fee.
1.4  Excise taxes for oil  For oil: rate  set at RUB 66 in 2001  per ton extracted,  with
and gas  no  differentiation  according  to  rent-generating  factors,  in
contradiction  to  Article  46  of the  Law  "On the  Subsoil."
For  natural  gas:  15%  of sales  value  for  domestic  market
(30% for exports), accruing on a cash basis.
7  Some  of  these  taxes  will  likely  soon  be  subject  to  revision  in  the  context  of  the  Putin-Kasyanov
administration's new economic  strategy.
8  VSMB in Russian.
9Type of  payment  Description
1.5  Fees for the use of
the sea bottom
1.6 Export duties  Rates vary according to commodities.
1.7 Production sharing
agreements9
1.7.1  Bonus  One-time payment,  the level of which is set contractually,
and  which  is  due  upon  signature  of  the  agreement  or
achievement of the contractual  results.
1.7.2  Rental  Same as  1.1 above.
1.7.3  Royalty  Same as  1.2 above.
2. Energy product
taxes
2.1 Taxes on fuels and  Tax on oil refineries.
lubricants
2.2 Excise tax on  Limited  to  gasoline  sold  on  the  domestic  market.  Rates
gasoline  range from RUB 80 to RUB 370 depending on octane.
3. Fees for the use of  Divided into mineral and living resources.
the continental shelf
4. Forest user fees  See infra.
5. Surface water user  Paid  for  a  number  of  water  uses,  including  industrial
fees  processes,  production  of  drinking  water,  use  by  the
hydropower and transport  sectors. Irrigation is exempt.
6. Pollution charges  See infra.
7. Land use payments
7.1 Land taxes  Land  taxes  are  due  on  private  land  or  land  used  under
conditions  of  life-long  possession.  Land  taxes  are  the
lowest on forested land.
7.2 Land rentals  Land rentals are due on public land, i.e.  land owned by the
state, regions or municipalities.
7.3 Normative prices  Normative  prices  are paid upon  transfer of land  from  the
state to  private hands.  Payments  are the highest on  urban
land,  reaching  very  high  levels  in  city  centers,  but  are
extremely low in rural  areas.  By law, normative  prices do
not exceed 75% of market value.
8. Payments for the use  Used  to  fund  research,  management,  protection  and
of aquatic biological  reproduction  of aquatic biological  resources,  in addition to
resources  fines for damage  to resources  and  violations of normative
acts. Payment made upon receipt of the fishing quota. Rates
range  from  RUB  20/t  for  Far  Eastern  herring  and  Far
Eastern salnon to RUB 10,000/t of high-grade crab.
9 The final tax status of PSA has not been decided yet. The taxes presented here are probably the minimum.
10Type of payment  Description
9. Payments for the use  Payments  for hunting wild  animals  consist of a permit per
of terrestrial biological  animal  killed  or  day  spent  hunting,  and  a  penalty  for
resources  infractions.  Payrnents  are  determined  in  relation  to  the
minimum wage  (e.g., the license to kill a beaver equals 0.2-
0.6  *  the minimum wage,  while  for a bear it  equals 3-6  *
the  minimum  wage).  For  plants  and  animals  listed  as
protected  species in the Red Book, no regular licenses can
be  granted  but  fines  are  applicable  to  punish  hunting  or
collection. These fines are set as a multiple of the minimum
wage  as  well  (e.g.  for plants,  they  range  from  0.2 to  300
times the minimum wage).  Finally, small  entrance  fees  are
sometimes charged for the right to visit national parks.
Sources: Arthur Andersen (1998);  GOR (1996); IFEI (1998); Kasyanov (2001); Mikheva and Sheingauz
(1999); Roskoshnaya (2000); Sagers et al. (1995); Shevchuk  (1999); Titova (2000).
Oil and Natural Gas
Oil and Natural Gas in the Russian Economy
2.2  The  energy  sector,  in  particular  oil  and  gas,  is  central  to  the  Russian  economy.
Depending  on  economic  conditions,  oil  and  gas  earn  20-40%  of  consolidated  budget
revenues  and  30-40%  of  foreign  exchange  earnings.  In  1999,  the  oil  and  gas  industry
employed 618,000 people, including 416,000 in oil extraction,  117,000 in oil processing, and
85,000 in gas extraction.  It is thought that the relative  recovery of the Russian  economy  in
1999  and  2000  is  owed  to  the  comparative  advantage  of local  production  following  the
depreciation of the ruble, and to the soaring crude oil prices on world markets. Despite years
of adjustment,  energy  is still much  cheaper in Russia  than  abroad,  which  distorts  resource
allocation by subsidizing domestic industry  (IFEI 2000).  For example,  domestic  oil refining
is  in some  cases  value-subtracting  since  its  actual  revenues  are  lower  than  the  potential
exports of crude oil.
Tax Regime in the Upstream Oil Sector
2.3  Taxation has been identified  as one of the main  issues deterring  investments  in the
Russian  oil  sector.  "The  Russian  system  of taxation  is  generally  believed  to be one  of the
most complicated,  burdensome  and unpredictable  in the world" (Arthur Andersen  1998,  5).
The Russian system of upstream oil taxation consists of two regimes:  the regime for licensed
oil  and  the  regime  for  production  sharing  agreements.  By  far  the  largest  share  of oil
production  is  under  the  former  regime,  although  badly  needed  foreign  investments  are
overwhelmingly in favor of the latter.Licensed oil
2.4  In addition to all the general taxes imposed at the national and sub-national  levels, oil
companies pay taxes that are  specific to the oil sector.  These include:  (1) export  duties;  (2)
oil excises; (3) royalties; (4) bonuses; and (5)  geological fees.
2.5  The export duty was  introduced  in January  1992  as  a wedge between  domestic  and
foreign prices. The rate was initially set at ECU 26 per ton of crude oil and gradually reduced
to  ECU  15  per  ton  in  mid-1996,  as  part  of the  Government's  commitment  to  bringing
domestic  energy prices  in  line with international  ones.  The oil  export duty was completely
phased out in 1997, but then reinstated in 1999 as world prices took off. Export duties accrue
to  the  federal  government.  In  2000,  the  governmental  Commission  on  Foreign  Trade
Protection adopted a new floating tariff system, whereby the export duty is tied to the market
price of oil. Table 5 shows the progressive relationship between oil prices and export duties.
This  scale  refers  to  crude  oil  exports  beyond  the  Customs  Union  of Russia,  Belarus,
Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and Tajikistan.  Though  the scale  does not have  power of law, the
government broadly follows in when it sets export duties by resolution.  The duty currently in
force is in the highest bracket, somewhat independently of fluctuations in the oil price.
Table 5.  Oil Export Duty and Oil Prices
Oil price (average price of  Export duty
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Source: Brunswick Warburg (2000).
2.6  The  excise tax was  set  up in August  1992  at  a  rate  of 18%  of oil sales  value (ad
valorem).  It was  then  differentiated  to account  for  variations  in  production  costs (0%  for
high-cost  producers,  24%  for  medium-cost  producers,  and  42%  for  low-cost  producers).
Excise rates increased as export tax rates decreased.  In April  1994, it was transformed into an
ad quantum (specific) tax indexed  to the RUBIUSD  exchange rate.  The range selected was
RUB  0-85  per  ton,  with  an  average  of RUB  55.  Article  46  in the  current  law  "On  the
Subsoil"  clearly  states  that  the  system  of mineral  excises  must  reflect  the  economic  and
geographic  conditions  of each  deposit,  i.e. the  differential  rent (GOR  1992).  Nevertheless,
the  Russian  government  has  never  worked  out  the  corresponding  excise  rates,  so  this
provision remains hollow.  Instead,  in January 2000, the range was eliminated  and the excise
12tax  standardized  at RUB  55  per ton,  regardless  of the deposit's  economic  and geographic
conditions  (IFEI  1998).  In 2001,  the standard  rate was raised to RUB  66 per ton. Revenues
accrue to  the federal  government,  except under special  agreements between  the federal  and
regional  governments  (e.g., the Republic of Bashkortostan  and Samara Oblast).  Excise taxes,
given their ad quantum nature,  have  a regressive  impact:  the relative tax take  increases  as
market prices  decline.  On  the  contrary,  for the  tax  system  to  be more  neutral,  the tax  take
should increase with profitability (Thomson  1998).
2.7  The  royalty  was  introduced  in  May  1992  as  payment  for  use  of the  subsoil.  If
properly designed,  it could become  a reliable rental payment.  This is currently not the case,
however.  The royalty is an ad valorem tax based on wellhead prices (revenues) before  excise
taxes.  Lower-cost fields pay a higher rate. The current range is from 6% to 16% of sales, with
the average  royalty at about 8%.  The royalty is determined by negotiation or through bidding
for new fields. It is fully deductible for tax purposes. Royalties are directly linked to the price
of oil,  which  makes  them  neutral  with respect  to  their  effect  on  the timing  and level  of
investment.  Nevertheless,  due  to  their  exceedingly  uniformn  rates,  they penalize  relatively
marginal fields. Rates should thus be differentiated  further.
2.8  Bonuses,  first used in October  1992,  are one-time payments negotiated as part of the
license bid, and subject to a statutory minimum.
2.9  The  mineral replacement tax (also,  and more  accurately,  called  geological  fee)  was
imposed in February  1993, as a deduction  to insure exploration  and discovery to make up for
depletion.  It is an ad valorem tax,  ranging  from 0 to  10%  depending  on regions  and firms.
Revenues  are earmarked  to  a federal extra-budgetary  fund used to cover exploration  by the
Geology Committee.
Proposed  Changes in Licensed Oil Taxation
2.10  To  improve  the  system,  the Russian  government  has  planned  for  several  years  to
allow oil producers to move  from mainly revenue  and excise taxes  to a profit-based  system
on an elective basis. The latter would have three main components  - a reasonable royalty, the
generally applicable  corporate profits tax and a special profits  tax. The  special profits tax is
meant  to  capture  windfall  profits,  i.e.  rents.  In  order  to  avert  a  situation  in  which  oil
companies would return zero profits, depriving the government from crucial revenues, the tax
move  would  be  accompanied  by  an  accounting  and  auditing  reform,  mandating  that  all
companies  electing the new profit-based  regime  adopt international  accounting and auditing
standards.  At least in principle,  the move has the favor of most international  investors who
are keen to see taxation vary as a function of profits instead of revenues and volumes.
2.11  Progress  in implementing  this  change  has  been  very  slow,  but the  government  is
giving renewed  consideration  to a  "tax  on additional  profits  from  fossil  fuel  extraction"l 1
(TAPFFE).  A  law  titled  "On  the  payment  for  the use  of mineral  resources"  was  drafted,
while similar dispositions were included in the draft of Part II of the new Tax Code. This new
10Nalog na dopolnitelnyi dokhod ot dobychi uglevodorodov in Russian.
13tax  is designed  to replace the current oil excise  tax on an elective  basis. For the  companies
electing  not to  switch to that system,  a new differentiated  excise  tax  would be adopted.  In
addition, the drafts provide for a widening of the royalty band (Lapyunova and Reznik 2000).
The TAPFFE would work in the following way: all the sales revenues  accumulated since the
beginning of a project would be divided by the accumulated eligible costs, to determine a so-
called  "R-factor"  for each  site. The  size of the R-factor would then determine  the tax rate.
The tax base would be defined as accumulated  revenues minus  accumulated costs with some
corrections.  The TAPFFE takes a long-term  approach to taxation as it considers all revenues
and costs  accrued since the first year of the project. Table 6 shows one of the latest proposals
of tax rates.
Table 6.  Proposed Tax on Additional Profits from Fossil Fuel Extraction
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Source:  Ministry of Finance.
2.12  Some of the problems with the TAPFFE are that:  (1) tax rates may be too aggressive
(progressive)  for investors  to adopt the system; (2) the new tax may end up substituting  for
the excise tax only, while all other taxes would still apply; (3) it would probably  apply to new
oil licenses only, leaving a large share of the rent under existing operations untapped; (4) the
notion of site is vague; and (5)  as a profit-based tax, it gives no incentive for rational resource
management and does not rule out profit concealment.
2.13  The  new  administration  has  reaffirmed  its commitment  to  some  sort  of an  excess
profits tax. The recent governmental  strategy plans a "tax on excess  income from extraction
of hydrocarbons  ([in]  replacement  of the  excise  tax  on petroleum  for new  deposits  and  a
portion of royalties)."  (GOR 2000,  150)  The Finance Ministry has  confirmed  that royalties
would  be  reduced  in order to  encourage  tax  compliance.  So  the  excess  profits  tax would
replace mostly royalties instead of excise taxes, as under the TAPFFE proposal.
2.14  Regarding  the  new differentiated  excise  tax,  rates  would  vary between  RUB  0 and
RUB 80 per ton (a return to the old range), as opposed to the currently fixed rate.
2.15  Until  these  legal  provisions  become  effective,  the  government  will  continue  to do
what it has  done  since the  escalation in oil prices  in 1999, which is to rely on export duties
for  withdrawing  part of the  rent.  Export  duties,  made  flexible  to vary with world  market
prices, are an effective means of capturing the rent, though they discriminate  against exports.
To  the  Ministry  of Finance  they  provide  the  guarantee  that  oil  ownership  translates  in
revenue collection.
2.16  Although taxation is partly to blame for low investments  (and thus rent wastage)  and
low rent  capture  in  the Russian  oil  sector,  changes  in  taxation  alone  will  not provide  the
14answer  to  low  rent  capture.  Other  issues  must  be  addressed  as well,  including  access  to
export pipeline and transfer pricing.
2.17  Vertically  integrated  companies  (VICs)  practice  transfer  pnrcing,  whereby  they use
legal loopholes  to  minimize their tax liability.  Under transfer pricing,  the oil producer  sells
only part of its production  directly on export  markets, the bulk being sold at artificially low
prices to the parent company, which is located abroad or in regional tax havens. Although the
federal government has cut tax privileges in an effort to reduce transfer pricing, regional  and
foreign laws still exist to take advantage  of tax havens.
2.18  Acess to export pipelines is restricted  through a non-transparent  system of quotas. As
a result,  approximately  50 million tons of oil are forced  on the domestic market  every year,
depressing  domestic  prices  and  wasting  value.  For rent  to  be  maximized,  the  government
should allow oil producers to export up to the level of foreign demand. Short of building new
pipelines,  access  to existing pipelines should be made  more competitive,  for example  using
auctions,  and conditioned  on timely tax payments  (Thomson  1998). The rent  captured  could
then be used to cut taxes or target social needs more efficiently than through indiscriminately
low domestic oil prices.
Production Sharing Agreements
2.19  Continuous  changes  in  the  tax  regime  have  represented  a  major  impediment  to
investments  in the Russian oil  sector.  Investors are wary to  spend large sums  of money  on
long-term,  high-risk  projects  without  guarantees  about  the  future  tax  regime.  Production
sharing agreements  (PSA) are  designed  to provide this  guarantee.  Under a PSA,  the private
investor takes  on the  full risk of the investment  and the  state retains  full ownership  of the
resource.  When production starts, the oil (or its proceeds) is shared between the state and the
investor according to contractual clauses: one part is "cost oil," which allows investment cost
recovery,  and  the  second  part  is  "profit  oil,"  for  remunerating  the  risk  and  capital.  The
remaining oil (or its proceeds) belongs to the state.  In some countries, the financial  clauses of
the PSA supplant all other taxes, while in others taxes still apply within the PSA framework.
The important point is that all tax provisions not specifically included in the PSA are waived.
To the investor, PSA offers two advantages of allowing  for cost recovery before the payment
of taxes,  and locking in taxes for the duration of the project  upon contract  signature.  To the
state, PSA usually ensures a high volume of private investments without investment risk.
2.20  Unfortunately,  under the PSA chapter,  as under licensed  oil, the Russian  government
has been slow to pass the necessary legal texts and ensure  consistency.  As regards  taxation,
Article  13 of the  Law on Production Sharing  Agreements  provides  that the investor pays a
profit  tax,  a  royalty,  and payroll  taxes  and  is  exempt  from  all  other  taxes,  levies,  duties,
including  customs  duties,  excise  taxes  and  other  mandatory  payments  imposed  by  the
Russian legislation. However,  the latest drafts of Part II of the new Tax Code contradict the
aforementioned  Law  by  reintroducing  several  taxes  in  the  PSA  investors'  tax  liability,
including  excises.  Needless  to  say,  this  defeats  the  purpose  of stability  and  predictability
(Thomson 2000).
15Estimation of Oil Rents
2.21  Oil  production,  in  particular  when  sold  on  foreign  markets,  has  recorded  sharp
increases  in  profitability  since  1998,  as  illustrated  in  Table  7.  As  a  share  of sales,  net
profitability rose from  1% in 1998 to 37-55% in 1999. The increase continued in 2000.
2.22  How  much  of that is normal  entrepreneurial  profit,  how  much  is  rent?  Large  rents
have  been claimed to exist  in the oil and gas  sector.  For example,  estimated oil rents were
estimated  at  over  US$  20  billion per annum  in  the  early  to  mid-1990s  (Lvov  1994;
Markandya  and Averchenkova  2000).  The  paragraphs  below  renew  the  estimation  of the
current oil rent for the years 1999 and 2000.
Table 7.  Financial Breakdown of Russia's Oil Exports
(US$/ton)
1998 a  1999 a  1 9 9 9 b  1999 c
Export crude oil price  77.9  144.9  120.7  104.8
Excise tax  9.1  2.2  2.2  --
Royalty  6.0  11.6  2.2  --
Mineral base replacement  4.6  8.7  2.6  --
Road fund  1.1  2.9  0.6  --
Property tax  1.7  0.7  0.6  --
Social insurance  2.5  0.9  1.1  --
Local and other taxes  0.5  0.2  0.5  --
Transport, customs fees, port charges, handling  19.0  17.4  18.7  --
Direct production cost  15.6  12.8  6.0  --
Salaries  6.6  1.7  2.9  --
Depreciation, amortization  9.5  2.9  2.5  --
Other costs  0.6  0.4  0.0  --
Management  0.4  0.2  0.0  --
Pre-tax income  0.8  82.4  80.8  --
Net income  0.5  53.6  56.5  58.4
Net margin (%)  1.0%  37.0%  46.8%  55.4%
Sources: a) Nikoil (2000); b) IFEI (2000); c) Institut narodnokhozyaistvennogo  prognozirovaniya  Rossiiskoy
akademii nauyk.
2.23  Rent  should  theoretically  be  estimated  in an  intertemporal  framework  but  the data
necessary to carry  out such an analysis, in particular reliable discount and inflation rates and
marginal  cost  and  revenue  stream  estimates,  were  not  available.  Oil  auction  data,  which
could help measure  and  collect the  rent,  are  equally  absent.  The  analysis  is thus limited  to
average current rents using a net-back approach.
2.24  As per the schematic  in Figure  1, potential  rent consists  of realized  and  unrealized
rent.  Unrealized  rent is due  to allocative  inefficiencies.  In  this case,  the  inefficiencies  can
take the form of sales on the domestic market below the international price, leading to large
revenue losses. The unit unrealized rent (implicit subsidy)  to the national economy and those
16of other Commonwealth  of Independent States (CIS) economies was US$  40 per ton of crude
oil in 1999.
2.25  Such  a  sizeable  subsidy  costs  oil producers  but  also  gives  them  leverage  on  the
government,  including  in the  area  of tax  reform:  as  long  as  they  subsidize  the  national
economy, how can the government expect to capture a greater share of the oil rent?
2.26  Unrealized  rent  also  arises out of waste during extraction or production,  e.g.  if oil is
left in the ground. Worse,  rent is dissipated if the level of investments  is insufficient  to keep
production  levels  constant.  Russian  oil  wells  have  not been  kept  up,  so their  productive
capacity has deteriorated  and value  has been  wasted.  This trend  is hardly visible from  one
year to the other, as the volume extracted is relatively stable at 300-320 million tons, but over
a period of 50 years, this appears  more clearly,  as the chart in Annex illustrates.  Production
peaked at 570 million tons in  1987 and declined  steadily until 1996, after which it recovered
slightly. Although it seems evident that waste exists, it is difficult to value it. Conservatively,
this value will therefore be left at zero.
2.27  Next, Table  8 estimates the realized rent, or more exactly the recorded rent since it is
assumed that there is little or no illegal  extraction to  speak of. Recorded  rent comprises the
rent captured through  taxes and other levies,  the entrepreneurial  rent (normal profit), and the
appropriated  rent (excess payment).
Table 8.  Average Current Appropriated  Oil Rent
(licensed oil scheme)
1999  2000
No  Transfer  No Transfer
transfer  pricing  transfer  pricing
pricing  pricing
Revenues (US$/ton)  69.2  69.2  110.3  110.3
Production  costs (US$/ton)  a  19.4  19A4  26.6  26.6
Depreciation  (US$/ton)  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.4
Normal profit (US$/ton) b  15.9  15.9  15.3  15.3
Tax take (US$/ton)  27.9  16.6  48.0  28.5
Appropriated  rent (US$/ton)  3.5  14.7  18.0  37.5
Total foregone revenues  (US$ mn/yr)  1,071  4,492  5,760  12,001
a)  Including operating costs and net capital  investments, without taxes and depreciation.
b)  20% return on equity defined as market capitalization
Sources:  IFEI (2000).
2.28  Revenues  represent  the  weighted  average  of export  and  domestic  oil  sales  prices.
Export prices are DAF' Iprices. Domestic prices are the prices charged for oil delivered at the
" Delivered at frontier,  i.e. export gate.
17junction between  the producer's  and the  main  pipelines,  before  VAT,  for consumption  in
Russia and other CIS countries.  Production  costs include the weighted  cost of transportation
to  export  gates,  labor  costs  (including  auxiliary  personnel)  and  other  production  costs.
Nonnal profit is the profit needed to ensure a competitive  return on assets.  Rent captured is
the total tax take of the various levels of government, including the weighted shares of export
duties and customs fees on exports and VAT on domestic sales, oil excises,  subsoil user fees
(royalties),  mineral  replacement  fees  (geological  taxes),  road  taxes,  social  security
contributions  to  extra-budgetary  funds,  housing  taxes,  profit  taxes,  and  other  taxes.  Rent
appropriated  is the rent remaining at the  enterprises'  disposal  after cost recovery,  allowance
for a normal profit and payment of all taxes. The detailed data are presented in Annex.
2.29  The  average  rent  appropriated  by  oil  companies  is  derived  from  market
capitalization. 12 The  normal  profit  is  the  return  on  equity  expected  by  a  new  investor
acquiring  shares  in  an  oil company  for the  long  term.  All Russian  oil  companies  together
were worth an average  US$ 75-80 per ton of oil extracted  in  1999.  The last line in Table 8
suggests that the Russian government  forewent US$ 4.5 billion in revenues  in  1999 and US$
12 billion  in 2000.  This  does not include  part of the unrealized  rent that would be realized
and captured  if producers  were  free to  export as much oil as they wished.  US$  4.5  billion
represented about 9% of consolidated budget revenues in 1999. In other words, if the Russian
government  had captured  instead of foregone that rent, taxes on capital and labor could have
been cut by over 9% in 1999.
2.30  The  choice  of a  rate  of return  is  a controversial  matter.  Theoretically,  the  normal
profit  is the  opportunity  cost  of allocating  resources  to  the  current economic  activity.  The
opportunity  cost  is  the  profit  that  would  be  achieved  in  the  next  best  alternative.  The
corresponding  rate of return is then  applied to the investment  in the activity  at hand.  This
method  presupposes  that  opportunity  costs  are  easily  quantified.  However,  conditions  in
Russia  do  not allow  easy  quantification.  Reliable  information  about profit  margins  is  not
available,  and  opportunity  costs  are uncertain  because of multifarious  risks.  The ruble  has
experienced  wide  fluctuations  in  the  past  10  years,  ownership  rights  are  not  adequately
protected, tax regimes have a high propensity to change, banks go bankrupt, etc.
2.31  Practically,  the assumption here  is that resources invested  in oil extraction could be
allocated  to alternative  long-term  assets.  For example,  the  return on  the Russia  Eurobond
2007,  i.e.  the  debt  issued  in  foreign  currency  by  the  Russian  government  with  a  7-year
maturity yielded an average  16% in 2000. The Russia Eurobond  2007 is a relevant reference
asset  as  it gives  an idea of the  opportunity cost  of investing  money in  Russia  in the  long
term.'3 It involves a 10% risk premium over a risk-free asset such as the 7-year U.S. Treasury
bill.  The  question  is  whether  investments  in  the  Russian  oil  sector  should  receive  an
12  This method is used by the U.S.  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis to assess  natural resource  rent in the United
States under the name Current Rent Method I (BEA  1994, 2000).
13 The Russia  Eurobond  2007 yielded  an  average  30%  in  1999,  which is  quite high,  in the aftermath  of the
financial  meltdown  of August  1998.  The  downward  trend  in  yields  since  1999  indicates  that  investors  are
regaining  confidence  in  Russian  Eurobonds,  which  also  justifies  using  that  this  type  of instrument  as  a
benchmark for normal profit.
18additional risk premium due to the inherent risk. This question  can be debated at length.  The
stance taken here is that a premium on the order of 5%  on equity is acceptable, which yields
a normal profit rate of 20%.
Table 9.  Appropriated  Rent on Licensed Oil - Sensitivity Analysis
1999  2000
Profit  No  Transfer  No  Transfer
rate*  transfer  pricing  transfer  pricing
pricing  pricing
25%  Normalprofit(US$/ton)  19.9  19.9  19.1  19.1
Appropriated rent (US$/ton)  -0.5  10.7  14.2  33.7
Foregone revenues (US$ mn/yr)  -143  3,278  4,537  10,778
30%  Normal profit (US$/ton)  23.9  23.9  22.9  22.9
Appropriated rent (US$/ton)  -4.4  6.8  10.4  29.9
Foregone revenues (US$ mn/yr)  -1,357  2,064  3,314  9,555
* Normal return on equity defined as market capitalization.
2.32  Since  normal  rates  of return  are  controversial,  a  sensitivity  analysis  is  necessary,
which  conveys the change  in profitability  and rent  in response  to changes  in normal  profit
rates. Table  9 indicates that even with a high normal profit rate  (30%,  i.e.  Russia Eurobond
2007 +  15%), the total appropriated  rent still amounted to US$ 7 per ton in 1999 and $US 30
per  ton  in 2000.  The  normal  profit  rate  that  brings the  appropriated  rent  to  zero  in  2000
(assuming transfer pricing) is around 70%.  Assuming  a 20% normal profit rate and transfer
pricing,  Table  10 reconstructs  the  total current oil rent per ton of oil produced  in Russia  in
1999. The total average rent was estimated at US$ 95.4, consisting of the following parts: the
bulk is unrealized rent, as defined above, which amounted to US$ 40.5 per ton, or 42%  of the
total; normal profit equaled US$  15.9 or 17%, which was a little less than either the tax take
or captured rent  (US$ 24.2 or 25%) and a little more than the  appropriated rent (US$  14.7 or
15%).
Table  10. Total Current  Oil Rent in 1999
(US$/ton)
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy)  40.5
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit)  15.9
Captured rent (notional tax take)  24.2
Appropriated rent (excess profit)  14.7
Total rent  95.4
Estimation of Gas Rents
2.33  The firm  OAO Gazprom,  a natural  and legal monopoly,  accounts  for 92% of natural
gas  production  in  Russia.  It  is  the  largest  natural  gas  producer  in  the  world.'4 Gazprom
14  Plans  are  discussed  to  break  up  the  monopoly  into  Gazprom's  core  functions  (production,  transportation,
distribution,  etc.).
19employs  around  300,000  people  and  is  Russia's  largest  company  on  this  count.  The
production of natural gas, like that of oil, has diminished since the early 1990s, though much
less  dramatically  than  oil,  as  the  chart  in Annex  illustrates.  In  1999  it totaled  591  billion
cubic meters.
2.34  As in the case of oil, a large share of the natural gas produced in Russia is consumed
in the CIS. The Annex indicates that only about 3  1  % of the total production is exported,  58%
is  sold on the  CIS  markets  and  11%  is consumed  by enterprises  for their own  needs.  The
price difference,  which  arises from  local  regulations,  represents  an implicit  subsidy to  CIS
economies.  Given that the price  difference between  exports and  CIS sales was around US$
36 per thousand cubic meters  in 1999. As in the case of oil, the size of the total subsidy gives
gas  producers,  especially  Gazprom,  some  leverage  on  the  government  to  call  for  tax
concessions  and  other  privileges.  Gazprom  can  even  threaten  the  government  to  reduce
investments, which could damage energy security.
2.35  To  calculate  the  current  average  recorded  rent,  Table  11  uses  Gazprom's  market
capitalization  as  a basis  for  calculating  normal  profit.  As of December  1999,  Gazprom's
market capitalization was US$  7 billion.  A  15%  return on equity was applied in the central
scenario.  The normal profit rate selected  for natural gas is lower than for oil given the lower
level  or  risk  associated  with  gas  production  in  Russia,  mainly  because  Gazprom  is  a
monopolist.  The average  appropriated  rent was US$  8 per thousand  cubic meters  and  total
foregone  revenues  amounted  to US$  4.6  billion,  which  does  not  include  the  part  of the
unrealized rent that would be captured if  producers were able to export more.




Costs of sales  5.4
Depreciation  1.0
Normal profit *  2.0
Tax take  8.6
Appropriated rent  7.8
Total foregone revenues  (US$ mn)  4,598
* 15% return on shareholders' equity (valued at market capitalization).
2.36  Revenues  are  the weighted  average  of domestic  and  export  sales.  Production  costs
include  the  expenditures  on  energy,  labor,  transportation,  gas  purchases  from independent
suppliers, and marketing.  The tax take is the share of the rent that is captured by way of taxes
and  other levies,  including  the weighted  share of excise taxes  and VAT on domestic  sales,
the weighted share of excise taxes and export duties on exports, social security contributions,
as  well  as  the  road,  housing,  property  and  profit  taxes,  plus  taxes  on  subsoil  use  and
geological  taxes.  The appropriated  rent is the share of the rent remaining  after recovery  of
production costs, allowance for a normal profit and payment of all taxes and duties.
2.37  The  rent's  sensitivity  to  the  normal  profit  rate  reveals  that the  appropriated  rent
remains above US$  6 per thousand cubic  meters, even if the normal profit rate is set at 25%
20of market value.  Table  12 shows the results. The tax take is assumed fixed, since what varies
is the definition of normal profit, not actual profit.
Table  12. Appropriated  Natural Gas Rent - Sensitivity Analysis
(1999)
Normal  US$/
profit rate  *  thousand m3
20%  Normal profit  2.7
Tax take  8.6
Appropriated rent  7.1
25%  Normal profit  3.4
Tax take  8.6
Appropriated  rent  6.4
* Normal profit = % of market capitalization.
Table  13. Total Current Rent on Natural Gas in 1999
(US$/thousand rn3)
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy)  36.4
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit)  2.0
Captured rent (notional tax take)  8.6
Appropriated  rent (excess profit)  7.8
Total rent  54.8
2.38  The largest portion of the rent was the unrealized rent, which amounted to US$ 36.4
per thousand cubic meters,  or 66% of the  total; normal profit  equaled US$  2 or 4%, the tax
take or captured rent amounted to US$ 8.6 (or 16%), and the appropriated rent to US$  7.8 (or
14%).
Timber
2.39  Russia  has  the  largest  forest  resources  of any  country,  comprising  764  million
hectares  or  22%  of the  world's  forest  cover.  Russian  forests  also  account  for  21%  of the
world's  standing timber volume  (82 billion cubic meters) and provide the largest land-based
carbon storage in the world (World Bank 2000a).
The Russian Forest Revenue  System
2.40  Like  other natural resources,  timber is  under-priced  in Russia.  Stumpage  fees were
first established  under Czar Paul 1. Over time, they were refined to  reflect market prices  for
wood  products  and  the  rent-generating  factors  specific  to  different  forest  areas.  With the
advent  of communism,  however, market  relations were obliterated.  In the forest  sector this
implied a complete  overhaul of the stumpage  fee system.  In keeping  with the Marxist  labor
theory of value,  Soviet economists  in 1949  made stumpage  fees  a function of the labor costs
21of forest regeneration, disregarding the economic  and geographic  rent-generating variables of
forest  exploitation  (Barr  and  Braden  1988;  Letyagin  and  Pochinkov  1998;  Levin  1998;
Pitovranov  2000).  The correlation between  stumpage fees and rent was thus severed.  As the
proceedings of a recent workshop  gathering several dozens of forest specialists  from around
Russia concluded:
Current  forest  fee  rates  hardly  correlate  with  the  actual  (market)  value  of forest
resources.  The method of stumpage rates calculation was developed under conditions
of the directive plan  economy.  It is not based on the market pricing mechanisms  for
forest products and does not  take into account  the whole  complex of rent fonnation
factors.  The current minimum stumpage rates are significantly underestimated  and do
not reflect the actual value of forest resources.  (FER 2000)
2.41  Today  timber  user fees  are  set  at the  federal  level.  Article  103  of the  1997  Forest
Code  of the  Russian  Federation  provides  that  "payments  for use  of the  Forest  Fund  are
collected  in  the  form  of forest  taxes  or  a  rental  charge."  (GOR  1997)  Forest  taxes  are
stumpage fees, i.e. charges paid for the right to fell a given volume of standing timber. Rental
charges only differ from stumpage fees by the duration for which the right to fell is acquired:
stumpage fees are paid for a period of up to one year, while rental charges are paid for leases
between one and forty years.  5
2.42  Short-term  sales  and leases differ in at least two important respects.  First, short-term
cutting  rights  are  supposed  to  be  auctioned  off,  whereas  longer-term  leases  are  allocated
through  a technical and financial review of sealed bids, in which the price is not the deciding
factor.  Second,  different  specifications  are  attached  to  the two schemes:  in  the short-term
permit,  the  forest  user  does  not  have  precise  obligations  as  regards  forest  management,
whereas  a  lessee  must  fulfill  a  number  of  conditions  related  to  rotation,  logging,
reforestation,  road  building,  etc.  One  consequence  of the  absence  of  requirements,  in
particular  in  terms  of road  building,  under  the  short-term  scheme  is  that  cuts  tend  to be
limited to areas adjacent to roads and railroads, which become over-harvested,  while outlying
forest areas remain undeveloped.
2.43  The Russian forest  legislation makes provisions for forest revenue  sharing among the
various levels of government.  Article  106  of the Forest Code provides that regions with final
allowable cut  exceeding  1 million  cubic meters apportion the receipts of minimal stumpage
fees  and  rental  charges  as  follows:  40%  to  the  federal  budget,  and  60%  to  the  regional
budget.  The  receipts  corresponding  to  the  difference  between  minimal  and  actual  rates  is
reserved for the budgets of the forest management  agencies  (leskhozy).  In  1999,  the average
stumpage fee  in Russia was RUB  14, or about US$  0.50, per cubic meter (Petrov  1997  and
2000a).
1 In Russian, forest taxes are called lesnye podati and the rental charge arendnaya  plata.
22The Forestry Sector in the Russian Economy
2.44  In 1999, the forest sector accounted  for  1.5% of GDP, 4.8% of industrial output, 4.5%
of  export  earnings,  1.5%  of  consolidated  budget  revenues16,  3.3%  of  foreign  direct
investment,  8%  of industrial  employment,  and  2%  of total  employment  (Goskomstat;
Gostamozhkomitet;  Miklashevskaya  2000; NIPIElLesprom).
2.45  The sector has been affected by the  economic downturn surrounding the transition  to
a  market  economy.  Timber  harvesting  levels  declined  drastically  as  domestic  demand  for
wood products fell and transportation costs rose, from over 300 million cubic meters in  1990
to 80 million cubic meters in  1997 (see Annex).  The officially harvested volume nation-wide
amounted  to  157  million  cubic  meters  in  1999,  including  thinnings  and  salvage.  Illegal
logging and exports are widespread (BROC et al. 2000; OECD 1999; World Bank 2000a).
2.46  Output  from  the  downstream  industry  also  plummeted,  especially  in  the pulp-and-
paper branch.  However,  production volumes recovered  in 1998  and 1999,  in the wake of the
August  1998  real depreciation  of the  ruble, which boosted  exports  and import  substitution.
The recovery is continuing in 2000, with a  17% increase in output in the first 6 months of the
year  compared  to  the  first  6  months  of 1999  (World  Bank  2000b).  Table  14  gives  the
dynamics in reported profitability of the Russian forest sector. The logging branch is reported
to have been in dire financial straits until 1998, while wood processing,  in particular plywood
manufacturing,  has fared relatively well.  1998  and especially  1999 have  seen sharp gains  in
profitability across the board.
Table  14. Profitability of the Russian Forest Industry
(in percentage)
Branch  1990  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999*
Overall  17.4  36.0  24.0  10.1  15.5  -7.4  -7.7  -4.2  25.5
Logging  11.2  35.0  15.0  5.4  -6.2  -14.1  -20.9  -11.1  9.4
Sawn goods  24.1  39.6  23.0  6.7  2.2  -12.9  -14.6  1.8  11.2
Plywood  16.2  46.3  45.1  18.7  17.2  4.7  8.7  28.4  50.6
Furniture  32.0  30.0  33.2  23.0  10.5  1.2  4.1  7.1  17.6
Pulp and  14.9  32.0  27.0  22.6  35.2  -5.9  -2.3  12.9  37.9
paper
9 months.
Source:  Burdin et al. (2000)
2.47  The  fact  that  logging  was  reported  unprofitable  for four  continuous  years  between
1995  and 1998 is hard to believe,  even allowing for accumulation  of debt  arrears.  One must
remember  that  revenue  concealment  in  one  form  or  another  is  rampant  in  the  Russian
16 Including  an estimated  6.7% of export duties,  2.8% of CPT,  1.1%  of VAT, and 3% of natural  resource user
fees.
23economy  and  the  forest  sector  is  no  exception.  In  addition,  the  system  of non-payments
allows firms and the government  to trade in non-cash instruments,  which do not show up in
official statistics. Given the downward  bias of official statistics on profitability,  the return to
profitability in 1999 gives even more reason to believe that the sector is indeed recovering.
2.48  The fiscal  contribution of the  forest  sector is not commensurate  with the size of the
forest resource (World Bank  1994).  The potential tax revenues  from the forestry sector were
estimated  at  US$  0.9-5.5  billion per year  in  1996 depending  on  assumptions  about  wood
production  and the profitability  of forest enterprises,  i.e.  0.7-4.4%  of consolidated  revenues
(World Bank  1996). In  1999, the forest  sector still contributed  only about US$  0.55 billion,
or 1.1% of consolidated revenues (including profit taxes, VAT, excises and stumpage fees).
Low Rent Capture
2.49  The mediocre  fiscal  role of the  forest  sector  is due to a  complex  set of interrelated
issues,  including  low stumpage  fees, illegal  logging and exports, and poor collection  rate of
stumpage  fees.  The  first two  reasons  are  considered  here.  The  third reason  is  common  to
most every natural resource and every tax in Russia and is discussed in more detailed later in
the context of the non-payments problem.
Low Stumpage Fees
2.50  Russian stumpage prices are less than 2-3% of the market price for timber, compared
to  65% in Finland  (Sokolova 2000). Russian  stumpage  fees are low for several  reasons.  As
was  explained  above,  federally  mandated  minimal  stumpage  fees  do  not  reflect  rent  or
market conditions.  Other reasons  include:  (1) the cap  imposed on actual stumpage  fees;  (2)
high road building  and transportation  costs;  (3) low value added;  (4) political risks;  and (5)
distorted domestic and export timber market structures.  When analyzing reasons  2 through 5,
it helps to place Russia in international context. Finland is a meaningful reference  for Russia,
as  the  forests  are  comparable,  and  Finland  is  the  largest  importer  of timber  from  Russia,
either  for processing  or re-exporting.  Most of the Russian-Finnish  wood  trade  is  in round
wood  coming  from  European  Russia,  in  particular  the  Russian  North  and  Northwest.
Whereas in Northwest Russia the actual average stumpage fee per cubic meter of round wood
was RUB  14.5  in  1999,  or  about  US$  0.50  at  the  current  exchange  rate,  in  Finland  the
average rate hovered around US$  18,  i.e. about 30 times more (Petrov 2000b;  Finnish Forest
Research Institute 2000).
2.51  First,  the  Russian  legislation  limits  the  autonomy  of  regions  to  raise  federally
mandated minimal stumpage  fees: regions are only allowed to double the minimum rates.
2.52  Second, Finnish importers invoke the high costs of road building. Russian all-purpose
roads  are  few  and  of substandard  quality,  and  the  quality  of forest  roads  is  even  worse.
Harvesters  thus  spend  considerable  resources  building  roads  or  otherwise  overcoming
transportation  difficulties.  The  higher  the  cost,  the  lower  the  residual  stumpage  value.
Although this argument holds some truth, it should be qualified in the following way.  Firstly,
much timber is cut in the winter in Russia, at a time when roads are of less importance  since
24the  ground  is  frozen.  Secondly,  labor  and  fuel  costs  are  much  lower  in  Russia  than  in
Finland, which compensates to a certain degree for high transportation costs.
2.53  Third, the realized rent is much lower  than the potential rent due to low value added.
One problem is the overall  inefficiency of forest enterprises,  starting with high wastes of raw
material.  Waste rates ranging between  25% and 75% of all timber cut have been reported for
the Soviet period (Levin 1992; Nilsson et al.  1992; World Bank 1997). Losses of 40-60%  are
reported  for  the present  time  in  the Russian  Far East  (BROC  et al.  2000).  Wasted  timber
represents  unrealized  rent,  so  less  efficient  operations  will  be  ready  to  pay  only  lower
residual stumpage values.  In addition, Russian wood may not quite be of the same quality  as
Finnish round wood.  Wrong assortment  size and late delivery damage  the quality of timber,
while the sorting,  drying  and grading of lumber  often  leave much  to be desired.  The  lower
the quality of timber  and lumber,  the  lower the  stumpage  value.  Arguably,  the continental
climate causes the diameter of trees of identical  species to be lower in Russia than in Finland
(Myllynen 2000; Voronkov  2000). The lower is the diameter, the higher is the cost to supply
a given volume,  and the lower the residual stumpage value. Finally, the Russian forest sector
stands out by the prevalence of logging.  This underdevelopment  depresses  stumpage values
(NIPIEILesprom).  Russia  predominantly  produces  round  wood,  which contains  much  less
value added than, say, plywood or fiberboard.  Wood products with less value added naturally
fetch  lower  sales  prices  and  generate  less  rent  than  higher-value  added  products.  In  other
words,  stumpage  fees  in  Russia  will  be  lower  in  Russia  than  in  countries  with  more
developed wood transformation sectors (Gray 1983; Lebedev  1998).
2.54  Fourth,  political  risks  are  widespread  in  Russia's  unstable  economy.  Arbitrary
changes  in  tax  regime,  expropriation,  racket,  bureaucratic  hassles,  and  corruption  all
contribute  to  increasing  the  transaction  costs of doing  business  in Russia.  The  higher  the
transaction costs, the lower the stumpage value.
2.55  Fifth, several market  structure  features prevent  competition  for timber resources  and
can be identified as impeding a raise in  stumpage fees. Firstly, leskhozy, the public agencies
in  charge  of  forest  management,  benefit  from  legal  privileges,  which  give  them  market
advantages  and reduce  competition.  By law,  leskhozy are exempted  from stumpage  fees  and
most other taxes,  except taxes on payrolls,  personal income (levied at a rate of 12% only)  and
road  use  (Sokolova  2000).  In  addition,  they  do  not  have  to  compete  in  auctions  to  buy
harvesting  rights,  yet  they  exercise  commercial  activities  under  the  guise  of  forest
management.  These  privileges  significantly  reduce  market  competition.  The  lower  the
competition for timber, the lower the stumpage price.
2.56  Secondly, timber auctions themselves are deficient. Although auctions have existed in
Russia  since  the  mid-1990s,  they  are  generally  thought  to  be  of poor  quality,  due  to  a
combination  of  factors  including  inadequate  publicity,  insufficient  number  of bidders,
collusion  among  bidders,  price  fixing  by  auction  organizers,  and  other  market-biasing
practices (Efremov et al.  1999; HIID et aL  1998; Jacobsen  1999;  Lehmbruch  1999). 17 Again,
17 Here is a revealing  account of how forest auctions are held in Russia:  "According  to Russian legislation,  both
auctions  and tenders require more than one bidder.  But if the authorities would strictly follow this requirement,
no  forest resources  would be utilized,  since  there are  so few  potential  bidders  in Murmansk  . . . The typical
25the lower the competition,  the lower the stumpage  fees  and the lower the extraction of rent.
Furthermore,  auctions make up only a small share of the total sales of standing timber (15%),
the  rest  consisting  of  direct  sales.  Although  these  sales  are  called  konkurs,  implying
competition,  the competitive element may not be present  at all.
2.57  Thirdly, market power may be present. The export and domestic market relations  are
examined  in  turn.  Since  European  Russia  exports  so  much  to  Finland,  one  can  wonder
whether  Finnish  importers  dictate  their  prices  to  Russia.  It  is  no  secret  that  every  year,
sometimes  more  than  once  a  year,  Russian  exporters  and  Finnish  importers  gather  to
negotiate the import prices of timber for the following period.  Prices are set per cubic meter
of round wood (mostly birch pulpwood)  delivered at the first railway station past the Finnish
border. The current price is EUR 30.60.  To determine whether Finnish importers dictate their
price to Russia, one must compare  the import price to the price for domestic birch pulpwood
in Finland.  According  to Finnish academic and business experts, Russian birch pulpwood  is
slightly more  expensive than the Finnish  equivalent  at the border gate.  In total, however,  it
comes out a little cheaper as transportation distances  for Russian wood from the border to the
mills are generally shorter than for Finnish wood,  and overhead  costs  are higher on Finnish
than Russian purchases,  essentially  due to the high number of Finnish  suppliers.18 Finnish
companies thus find it profitable to import Russian birch pulpwood to supply their pulp-and-
paper  plants,  but not in virtue  of the particularly  low price of raw materials.  Instead,  they
need to import Russian birch pulpwood as the capacity of the Finnish supply is inadequate to
meet  the demand.1 9 Nonetheless,  by doing so  they  also depress  the demand  and price  for
Finnish  birch  pulpwood,  which  is  used  here  as  reference  for  Russia  (Jaaskelainen  2000;
Niskainen 2000; Rytkonen  2000). Hence one can conclude that the import prices of Russian
wood to Finland  seem  to broadly  follow  the  domestic  Finnish  market price,  even  if some
depressing  feedback  effect  on  domestic  market prices  is  inevitable.  This  finding  is in line
with earlier literature (University of Joensuu  1996). The low level of Russian stumpage fees
is not the consequence of artificially low import prices imposed by Finland.20
procedure seems to be the following:  a single bidder proposes  his bid, which is (close to) the reservation price.
The leskhoz selects an appropriate  area for leasing and utilization and the formal documents  are prepared. Only
then is the auction or tender announced  in the newspapers.  If more bidders should suddenly appear - fine - this
would increase the price. If not,  the first single bid proposed  would be realized....  The  conmmon denominator
[of forest auctions  in Murmansk  in 1999]  is that there was only one bidder  .... Since there  is often only one
potential buyer who is located  close  to the timber resources  offered,  the  FFS  [Federal  Forest Service]  faces  a
problem in defining a reservation price,  which does  not under-value  the timber resources.  The stumpage price
may easily  become  the  final  reservation  price.  The potential  buyer has  no intention  of giving  a  higher bid,
knowing that there is no real competition going on." (Jacobsen  1999,  13-14)
18 60% of Finnish forests are owned by 400,000 small holders, which increases the number of business partners.
In Russia, by contrast, the number of exporters is relatively limited.
19 The supply of birch pulpwood from Finnish producers is estimated at 4 million m3, while the Finnish industry
needs 9 million mn
3 annually (Jaaskelainen 2000).
20 Incidentally,  research has revealed no signs of oligopsony power in the Finnish wood market either (Ronnila
and Toppinen 2000).
262.58  One must therefore turn one's attention to the structure of the Russian timber market
itself.  Although  analysis  is  limited  by  the  availability  of data,  Russian  loggers  might  be
subject  to  some  local  monopsony  or  oligopsony  power,  i.e.  the  power  that  one  or  a  few
buyers  can  exercise  on a  larger number  of sellers  (Nilsson  2000).  Such  power may result
from the naturally  small number of buyers  at the local  level, but in a criminalized context it
may  also  signify  that  local  buyers  use  duress  to  procure  raw  materials  at  less-than-
competitive  prices.  Buyers  may  be  wood  processing  firms,  trading  intermediaries  or
transporters  who  engage  in rent  seeking.  Some  are  downstream  enterprises,  i.e.  down  the
forestry chain  from loggers,  others outside  of the  forestry chain altogether (e.g.  pure trading
intermediaries).  The growth  of intermediaries  in the Russian  forest  sector  has been  attested
before  (see,  e.g.,  Sokolova  2000).  Transporters,  too,  may appropriate  rent.  Given  the  long
distances  involved,  transportation  costs  are  known to  influence  enterprises'  profitability  in
Russia.  Most  of the  timber  is  transported  by  railroad.  Because  of high  railroad  tariffs,
Siberian  timber  in  CIS  countries  or  European  Russia became  unprofitable  when  implicit
transportation  subsidies  were  cut. Indeed in the early  1990s, railroad  tariffs were  a multiple
of timber sales prices (Blam et al. 2000; Sokolova  2000). Railroad  tariffs have been  cut and
restructured  on  several  occasions  in  the  past  few  years  but  they  are  still  thought  to  be
excessive  nowadays  (Carlsson  et  al.  2000).  The  Russian  railroads  discriminate  heavily
between  domestic  deliveries  and  exports,  imposing  a  de facto additional  export  duty  on
international sales.  For example,  in the  second quarter of 1999, tariffs  for export sales were
3-4  times  higher  than  for  domestic  sales  of most  commodities  including  wood  products
(GOR 1999).  This means that the railroads  either appropriate rent on the export of timber or
cross-subsidize domestic sales, or do a mix of the two.
2.59  Local  market  power  increases  with  the  trends  towards  integration  in  the  Russian
forestry  sector.  Through vertical integration,  upstream  and downstream  companies  merge  to
control  the  whole  production  chain  from  timber  logging  to  advanced  wood  processing
(Lehmbruch  1999; Popovskaya and Rozanova  1998).  The integration under way in the forest
sector has been coined "backward  integration:"  wood processing  companies  directly finance
harvesting  enterprises  (Carlsson  et al.  2000).  Vertical  integration  may  reduce  transaction
costs and boost  the efficiency  and profitability of forestry operations,  which is why experts
have  advocated it for the Russian  forest  sector (Carlsson et al. 2000; Efremov  et al.  1999).
Increased  allocative  efficiency  also  results  from  rent  maximization,  provided  that  rental
payments  are  high  enough.  Unfortunately,  large  vertically  integrated  companies  exercise
greater influence on the remaining independent  loggers, each of them confined within its link
of the forestry chain and with no direct access to the international market.
Illegal Logging and Exports
2.60  When timber is logged or exported illegally, the government foregoes stumpage  fees,
export  duties,  and  other  revenues.  Illegal  cuts  and  exports  tend  to  be  linked,  since  the
customs service is supposed to verify the origin of registered timber exports.  When timber is
cut illegally, exporting it legally becomes more difficult.
2.61  The  unrecorded  rent  resulting  from  such  illegal  activities  could  assume  large
proportions.  For example,  expert estimates put the illegal cuts in the Russian Far East at 30%
27of the total actual cuts and illegal timber cuts in Russia at 12%  (WWF 2000). Poachers would
cut around 21  million cubic  meters per year,  or 15-20%  of total reported  cuts, with half of
that originating from the Russian Far East (Medetsky 2000).
2.62  A significant part of illegal cuts take the form of sanitary cuts by leskhozy. Here is an
unequivocal testimony by a leskhoz director in the Vladivostok region:
It is no secret that we ourselves, local forest services in administrative districts of the
Russian  Far  East,  are  some  of the  most  serious  violators  of forestry  rules  and
regulations.  Even though logging may be our only means to survive,  as we receive
almost no financing from the local administration  and from the government, we have
no right,  I suppose,  to log commercially  under the  label "salvage  logging."  (Viktor
Kozachko,  Director of the Melnichny  Leskhoz,  Krasnoarmeiskii  District, Primorsky
Krai, cited by BROC et al. 2000, 21)
2.63  Concerning  exports,  a variety of frauds  are possible, including outright  avoidance of
customs verification, bribing of officials, forged  export licenses, misrepresentation  of quality
or quantity,  etc.  Several estimates of the magnitude of the problem have been published. At
the high  end of the  spectrum,  one  source  reports  that the  actual  export  value  of timber is
double the  official  one  (RCN  1999).  An audit  carried  out  in  1995  at the  customs post  of
Vyborg  (Leningrad  region)  revealed  that  the  weight  of  export  cargoes  by  truck  was
underreported  by 20-25%  (University  of Joensuu  1996).  Based  upon  a  comparison  of the
Novgorod  region  customs  data  with  import  data  from  Finnish  firms,  it  is  estimated  that
illegal round wood exports from Novgorod to Finland did not exceed  10-15%  in 1999.
Estimation of Timber Rents
2.64  In order  to  estimate the  current  average  timber  rent,  at  least three methods  can  be
used. First, the simple net-back method nets out reported timber production costs from timber
market prices.  Second,  the  normative  net-back  method  consists  of netting  out  normnative
(engineering) timber production costs from timber market prices. Third, auction prices can be
used to  derive  the  rent.  In  this  method,  the  difference  between  actual  auction prices  and
minimal stumpage fees reveals the loggers'  willingness to pay for the timber, in other words
the stumpage appraisal value.21
2.65  Though some Russian  forestry specialists claim they know how to estimate the timber
rent (see,  e.g., Moiseev  1999), practically the task presents challenges.  Markets are generally
non-competitive  and reliable accounting information  is not available.  The literature is indeed
very poor  in  attempts  to  measure  the  timber  rent  in Russia.  Among  the  few  exceptions,
sources  have  reported  rents  in  the  region  of US$  6-25  per  cubic  meter  in  Khabarovsk
(Pankratova  1999;  Sheingauz  1997).  Recent  research  on  one  experimental  leskhoz  in  the
Moscow region using the normative net-back approach estimated that 23  out of the 28 forest
enterprises  operating  on the  territory  of that  leskhoz register  a positive  rent  ranging  from
21 Auctions will reveal the rent in the absence of road building costs, in accordance with the Russian legislation,
which provides that auctions are held for short-term  cutting permits not subject to road building obligations.
28RUB 8 to RUB 66 per cubic meter, with an average of RUB 33 (US$  1.20), i.e. almost twice
the  average  minimum  stumpage  fee  in  that  region  (Pochinkov  2000).  Separate  data  from
Irkutsk  Oblast  (southern  Siberia)  indicate  that export-grade  timber  fetches  RUB  1,000  per
cubic meter but costs only RUB 350 to produce.  The profit on such timber would equal RUB
650 or 65% of sales price (Shulyakovskaya  2000).
2.66  In  this  study,  the  simple  net-back  methodology  was  applied  to  8 Russian  regions
(Arkhangelsk,  Khabarovsk,  Krasnoyarsk,  Leningrad,  Moscow,  Novgorod,  Pskov  and
Vologda) and the Russian Federation as a whole using two data sets.
2.67  The first data set was  compiled from  original  data collected  from the 8 regions.  For
each region, average costs and prices  were obtained, covering  from a couple of logging firms
to  all  of them.  The  second  data  set  was  taken  from  NIPIElLesprom's  database,  which
comprises  cost information on 20,000 forest enterprises  in the whole of Russia for the year
1998. Costs for  1998 were multiplied by the 1999 producer price index in the forestry sector
(Goskomstat reports  1.572) to obtain  1999 costs.
2.68  There  exist  wide  discrepancies  between  the  two  data  sets.  In  particular,  the  costs
reported directly by the regions  come out much higher than the NIPIEILesprom  equivalent.
The  higher  costs  from  the  regions  are  thus  taken  as  the  higher  bound  estimate  and  the
NIPIElLesprom  figures as the lower bound estimate.
2.69  Using  the  two  data  sets,  notional  profits,  normal  profits,  notional  tax  takes,  unit
appropriated  rent,  and  foregone  revenues  were  calculated  using two different  techniques  -
the equity  and the  costs  techniques.  Though  the  data sets  are independent,  data from both
must be combined to calculate  some of the coefficients  or variables  in each technique,  which
means that the  calculations  themselves  are not totally independent.  For example,  transport
tariffs and handling  costs  are only available in the regional data set, while  the normal profit
rate is calculated with NIPEEILesprom  data.
Equity Technique
2.70  This  technique  calculates  normal profit  as  a return  on equity.22 In  the  regional  data
set,  production  costs  =  production  costs  at  lower  landing  minus  stumpage  fees.  In  the
NIPIEILesprom  set,  production  costs are  taken  as  such.  Then,  in  the regional  data set,  the
cost of sales  - production  costs  at lower  landing + transport tariffs + handling  costs;  and, in
the  NIPIElLesprom  set,  the  cost  of sales  =  production  costs  +  transport  tariffs  +  handling
costs. Next  a notional  gross profit  can be  estimated based  upon the available  revenues  and
costs. Notional  profit  is a reconstructed,  not actual  profit:  notional  gross profit = revenues
minus cost  of sales.  23  Using  the  regional  data  set,  the notional  tax  take,  which  is  the tax
22  This method  corresponds  to the  "Current Rent Method  I" of the U.S.  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (BEA
1994 and 2000).
23  Data include FOB (free on board) and CIF (cost insurance  freight) prices for round wood. CIF prices are used
here as the measure of revenues.
29liability that would be due if all taxes were properly assessed and collected  = notional  gross
profit  *  30%  (if notional  gross  profit  >  0)  +  stumpage  fees  +  export  duties.  Using  the
NIPEILesprom set, notional tax take = notional gross profit * 30% (if notional gross profit >
0) + export duties (stumpage  fees are included in production costs and cannot be dissociated).
All other taxes, in particular  social security contributions, are included in production costs in
both data sets. Unlike the oil and gas sectors,  forest companies  are not traded publicly and no
market  capitalization  data  exists to  estimate  equity.  For the  purpose of estimating  normal
profit,  a  standard return  on equity  therefore had to  be reconstructed  for the whole Russian
logging sector in the following manner.  Total assets in the Russian logging sector had a book
value of RUB 28.6 billion in 1998.24  1999 investments amounted  to just over RUB 2 billion
while depreciation amounted to just over RUB 1 billion. Converting each figure in US$ at the
appropriated  exchange rate and using the average  equity-to-assets ratio in the logging  sector
of 70%, total equity in the logging sector in  1999 was around  US$ 987 million.  A normal
profit  rate of 20% (Eurobond  2007  average  2000  yield plus  a premium of around  5%)  was
selected for the Russian  forest  sector.25  Given this rate and the timber cut  for main usage of
122 million cubic meters, the standard normal profit on equity for the Russian logging sector
for 1999 was estimated  at US$  1.62/m3 (Burdin et al. 2000;  Sakhanov 2000).  Then, the unit
appropriated  rent = notional gross profit minus notional tax take minus normal profit. Since
the unit appropriated  rent is estimated  for both domestic  sales and exports,  it is necessary to
weight  each  figure  by  the  relative  sales  shares:  weighted  unit  appropriated  rent  =  unit
appropriated rent on domestic sales * domestic sales share + unit appropriated rent on exports
*  export  share.  The  total  appropriated  rent,  or  foregone  revenues  =  weighted  unit
appropriated rent * total timber cut for main usage.26
2.71  The  Annex  gives  the synthesis  for  each region  and both  data sets,  while  Table  15
gives the aggregated results for Russia as a whole. Using the regional data set as lower bound
estimate and the NIPIEILesprom as upper bound estimate, the interval for the average current
appropriated rent on round wood was around US$  1.9 - 7.8  per cubic meter in 1999, which
means total foregone revenues of around US$  227 - 944 million per year.  In addition,  more
revenues are foregone because part of the rent is unrealized through excessive domestic sales,
which  could  be reallocated  to  export markets.  However,  as in the case  of oil  and  gas,  no
value  is attached  to this  category of foregone  revenues,  as it  is not clear  how much extra
timber from Russia foreign countries could import.
24 Book values tend to over-represent  reality given some of the peculiarities  of the Russian  accounting  system.
As  a  consequence,  the  calculated  normal  profit  might  itself  be  overestimated,  and  the  appropriated  rent
underestimated.
25 NIPIEILesprom  recommends  25% as a normal rate of return on capital  in the logging sector, but that seemed
too high as the rate for the central scenario.
26 Main usage means timber cut for use as round wood, lumber,  or to be processed. It excludes the  sanitary and
salvage cuts performed by leskho2y.
30Table  15.  Average Current Timber Rent - Equity Technique
(US$/m3)
Dataset  Regions  NIPIElLesprom
Domestic  Export  Domestic  Export
Revenues  (CIF price)  21.01  52.56  21.01  52.56
Cost of sales  17.00  34.22  10.21  27.42
Normal profit *  1.62  1.62  1.62  1.62
Profit tax take (notional)  2.34  8.90  3.24  9.82
Appropriated rent  0.04  7.83  5.94  13.70
Unrealized rent  12.00  0.00  12.00  0.00
Weighted average appropriated rent  1.86  7.76
Total rent appropriated (US$ inn)  227  944
* 20% return on equity
2.72  Table  16 identifies the various components of rent averaged across domestic  sales and
exports,  based upon Table  15.  It is worth noting that the  forest sector  generates a large total
rent. The government  captures about US$ 4 (or 20%) of the total rent, while less than US$ 2
(or  10%) is earned by forest enterprises  and intermediaries  as normal  and excess profit.  The
largest portion  of the  rent  (US$  9.69  or  57%)  is dissipated  through  the  local  economy  as
unrealized rent.
Table  16.  Total Timber Rent in Russia - Equity Technique
(US$/m3)
Regions  NIPIEILesprom
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy)  9.69  9.69
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit)  1.62  1.62
Captured rent (notional tax take)  3.85  4.76
Appropriated  rent (excess profit)  1.86  7.76
Total rent  17.03  23.82
2.73  Based  upon  the  main  usage  cut  of  121.6  million  cubic  meters  in  1999,  the total
implicit  subsidy  to  the  domestic  economy  amounted  to  US$  900  million.  However,  total
implicit subsidy does not equal foregone  revenues. If all the wood sold domestically were in
fact exported, some additional  revenues would be generated.  $9.69 per cubic meter would be
the  total  additional  before-tax  income to  the  exporter,  of which  30%  could be taxed  away
under the profit tax and 5% withdrawn by the export duty.  35% of the unrealized rent would
thus turn into public revenues, i.e. $3.40 per cubic meter.
2.74  However,  the  real  effective  subsidy  to  the  national  economy  may  still  be
underestimated.  First,  the  salvage  logging  and  thinnings  undertaken  by  leskhozy  do  not
generate any revenues  and are an additional  implicit subsidy. In 1999, for example, these cuts
amounted  to  22.9  million  cubic  meters,  or  19%  of the  main  usage.  Second,  part  of the
logging waste  should be included as unrealized rent as well.  Conservatively,  neither salvage
logging, thinning nor logging waste are captured in the tables.
31Costs Technique
2.75  The  costs  method  estimates  normal  profit  as  a  percentage  of  production  costs.
Although profit is usually not measured  as  a proportion of costs, this benchmark has in fact
been used in the forest sector in the Komi Republic,  which  is why the method is replicated
here. All variables are calculated as in the equity method, except normal profit. Here, normal
profit = production  costs  * a  coefficient  of 15%.  15%  is the rate that was used in Komi  in
1999.
2.76  Table  18  gives the  aggregated  results for Russia  as  a  whole (see the Annex  for the
details  per  region).  Again  using  the  regional  data  set  as  lower  bound  estimate  and  the
NIPEILesprom  as upper bound estimate, the interval  for appropriated  rent  on round  wood
was  in  the  range  of US$  1.6  - 8.5  per  cubic  meter  in  1999,  and  total  annual  foregone
revenues  amounted to US$  191  - 1,032  million, to which,  as above,  35% of the unrealized
rent should be added to obtain the likely total foregone revenues.
Table 17. Timber Rent in Russia - Costs Technique
(US$/m3)
Dataset  Regions  NIPIElLesprom
Domestic  Export  Domestic  Export
Revenues (CIF price)  21.01  52.56  21.01  52.56
Cost of sales  17.00  34.22  10.21  27.42
Normal profit *  1.92  1.92  0.90  0.90
Profit tax take (notional)  2.34  8.90  3.24  9.82
Appropriated rent  -0.25  7.53  6.66  14.43
Unrealized rent  12.00  0.00  12.00  0.00
Weighted average appropriated rent  1.57  8.49
Total rent appropriated (US$ mn)  191  1,032
a  15% return on costs
2.77  Table  18  distinguishes  between  the  various  components  of rent  averaged  across
domestic  sales  and  exports.  The  only difference  compared  to Table  16  is  the  distribution
between normal and excess profit.
Table 18. Total Timber Rent in Russia - Costs Technique
(US$/m3)
Regions  NIPIEILesprom
Unrealized rent (implicit subsidy)  9.69  9.69
Entrepreneurial rent (normal profit)  1.92  0.90
Captured rent (notional tax take)  3.85  4.76
Appropriated  rent (excess profit)  1.57  8.49
Total rent  17.03  23.82
322.78  Several  conclusions  and  caveats  are  in  order  before  closing  this  section.  First,  the
picture  emerging  is  that  a  significant  timber  rent  exists  in  Russia,  though  it  varies
considerably  across  regions.  Second,  the  variance  in  the  data  indicates  that  more  refined
methods of rent estimation must be deployed  in order to arrive  at a more reliable  picture of
the reality. Third, the local economy dissipates  a large share of the rent. Fourth, the total rent
on round wood was  derived from  the price  of round wood.  This method underestimates  the
rent since part of the round wood is in fact transformed into processed products, which fetch
higher market prices  and  profit  margin,  and thus also generate  higher rents.  Fifth,  the total
forest rent  is more than the rent  on timber or processed wood,  as it also includes the  rent of
land bare of forests.
Enhancing Timber Rent Capture
2.79  Forest  rent  can  be  captured  by  a  variety  of instruments.  In  the  particular  case  of
Russia,  profit  taxation  is  problematic,  due  to  lax  accounting  and  auditing  rules.  Another
option is to rely on export duties for capturing the rent on profitable  export transactions.  The
problem is that export duties distort resource  allocation between export and domestic sales at
the  expense  of exports.  Moreover,  unless  substantial  rents  are  known  to  exist  across  the
board, export duties penalize marginal operations,  since export duties are usually ad quantum
instruments.  An improved  system  of stumpage  fees should therefore  be privileged  as a rent
capture  instrument.  Enhancing  timber  rent capture  requires  more  than  an  improvement  in
stumpage  fee  system,  however.  It calls  for the  following  more  fundamental  reforms:  (1)  a
more  accurate  definition  of forestry  costs;  (2)  improved  knowledge  of forest resources;  (3)
better  use  of forest  resources;  (4)  increased  competition  in  the  timber  sector;  (5)  higher
investments in branches with higher value added; and (6) forest management certification.
2.80  A better  definition  of costs  could  imiprove  forest  revenues  and  public  revenues  in
general.  At  the moment,  accounting  rules  allow  firms to  include  in  their production  costs
items  that have  little to  do with  forestry,  which  artificially  depresses  reported  profits  and
residual  stumpage  values,  and thus  also  stumpage  fees. Normative  production  costs can  be
reconstructed without too much difficulty  for each type of technology  and location,  and help
forest authorities decide which costs and profit margins are acceptable.
2.81  Second,  the knowledge  of forest resources  can be  improved,  for example through  a
forest cadaster (quantitative  and qualitative register) and improved inventories, in accordance
with the  1997 Forest Code (Lebedev  1998).  This would help  the authorities better estimate
the  value of the  resources  they sell,  at  least until  such a time  when forest  auctions become
reliable price-setting  instruments.
2.82  Third,  the  use  of forest  resources  can  improve  through  better  allocation  of forest
parcels, based upon more rational forest planning.  This, too, will raise stumpage values.
2.83  Fourth,  more  effective  competition  in the timber  sector would  raise  stumpage  fees.
Possible  measures,  based  on  the  above  discussion,  include:  (1)  more  transparent  timber
auctions;  (2)  regulation  of monopolies  and  monopsonies;  (3)  limiting  leskhozy  to  forest
33management;  and (4)  regulation  of relations  among buyers  and  sellers  to  guarantee  sellers
proper market access.
2.84  Fifth, stumpage  fees will not rise to their full potential unless the economy  upgrades
to products with higher added value, e.g.  plywood and pulp and paper instead of round wood.
The  resources  needed  for  such  investments  should  not  necessarily  come  from  the  state,
however.  The  decades  of central  planning  have  shown  that  the  state  often  is  a  wasteful
entrepreneur.  Instead,  the federal and regional governments  should ensure that the conditions
are favorable for private enterprises  to invest. Ensuring  an "enabling  environment" has to do
with  general  economic  policy,  which extends  well beyond this paper.  But without  such  an
environment,  it is unlikely that the  forest sector will develop.  Road building represents  one
small, forest-related,  aspect  of that enabling environment  where the state may have  a role to
play.
2.85  Sixth,  certification  of  the  ecological,  economic  and  social  aspects  of  forest
management by internationally recognized  auditors  and following  internationally established
standards27 can help add value to timber production in the  form of price rises and/or gains in
market shares, and  alleviate illegal or harmful practices.  Certification can play an important
role in the Russian regions with access to export markets, in particular the Northwest, the Far
East  and  even  southern  Siberia,  the  latter  being  about  to  benefit  from  sharp  increases  in
China's demand for wood over the coming decades (Ptichnikov 1999; Simula  1999, 2000).
III.  RECENT NATURAL  RESOURCES  TAX REFORM INITIATIVES
3.1  A  few  recent developments  in Russian  regions  and new economic  initiatives  at  the
federal  level  may  be  signaling  renewed  interest  for  enhancing  the  fiscal  role  of  natural
resources.
3.2  At the  federal  level,  declarations  have  been made  in  favor of enhancing  the role of
rental payments.  The Putin administration adopted an economic  strategy that intends to lower
the fiscal burden on capital and labor and "to increase the fiscal  importance of taxes related
to use of natural resources  and also of property taxes, which should become the basic source
of revenue for regional  and local budgets." (GOR 2000,  149) The policy of lowering the tax
burden  on capital  and labor is already being implemented.  As of January 2001,  the  income
tax was transformed  from a progressive structure with top marginal rates exceeding 45% to a
flat  rate  of  13%,  while  employers'  social  security  contributions  were  cut  from  38.5%  to
35.6%.
3.3  In the natural resource taxation area,  the new Tax Code draft (Part II)  and a draft Law
"On  Paying  for  Mineral  Use"  provide  for  reforming  the  current  system  of licensed  oil
27  Existing  certification  systems include,  inter alia, the ISO  (International  Standards  Organization)  14001,  the
FSC (Forest Stewardship Council),  and the PEFC (Pan-European Forest Certification).
34taxation.  The new system would reduce  the number of taxes to three - a reasonable royalty,
the general corporate profits tax and a special (excess) profits tax.
3.4  At  the  regional  level,  Komi  and  Samara  have  started  differentiating  some  natural
resource user  fees  in  order to  reflect  and capture  a  greater share  of the rent.  The  northern
territories,  for their part, have passed a resolution to do the same.
3.5  Russia is a very large and diverse  country.  Legislative changes  involving  as many as
89 different regions  usually involve long debates.  In addition, natural  resource sectors wield
considerable  political influence.  It is therefore  hardly surprising that reforms of the resource
taxation  system  are  slow to  take  place  at  the  federal  level.  In  contrast,  some  regions have
exhibited innovative  approaches.  These demonstrate that changes  are possible when political
will is present. They also  show options for the federation as a whole.
Komi Republic
3.6  The Komi Republic,  located in the far north of European  Russia, contains  one of the
last remaining  expanses of taiga (old-growth dense  forest) in Europe  and the large Pechora
oil basin.  The  region has launched  a pioneering  experiment  in forest  tax reform  and  might
apply the same principles  to oil. In January 2000, a new regional  forest law came into force,
which  introduced the notion of timber rent and took steps towards  withdrawing  it. 28 The law
applies  a  normative  cost  methodology:  logging  costs  are  determined  using  a  series  of
engineering  relationships  based  on  the  quality  of the  forest  stand,  distance  to  roads,  soil
quality,  etc.  These  factors  are  objective  rent-generating  variables.  Subtracting  costs  and  a
normal  profit  allowance  from  the  market  price of round  wood  gives  the  residual  rent  on
timber. Using the new methodology, the  average rent was estimated  at RUB  100 per i 3, and
the total appropriated timber rent at around RUJB  690 million, i.e.  6 times the regional budget
for forest management  and 8% of the total regional budget (Karakchiev 2000).
3.7  The average  stumpage was  RUB  10 per m3 fee in Komi in  1999, in other words just
the  federally  mandated  minimum  rate.  By the  middle of 2000,  stumpage  fees ranged  from
RUB 6  to RUB 24 per m3 , with an average of RUB  15.  In effect,  the new Komi forest  law
differentiated  stumpage  fees  by determining  a  series  of rent-generating  coefficients  in  11
different  locations of the republic  (instead of 4 formerly),  and applying these coefficients  to
the standard minimal fees. This method results in more than twice as many stumpage fees  as
under the federally mandated  scheme.  Over  a period of one year (first quarter of 2000  over
first quarter  of 1999),  the  weight of stumpage  in the  price of round wood rose from  4.8  to
6.1%,  while  the  profitability  of round  wood  production  declined  from  25  to  21%.  On  an
annual  basis,  profitability  is  expected  to  decrease  from  14.8%  in  1999  to  13.5%  in  2000.
Despite the new coefficients,  the  regional  administration estimates  that no more than 6% of
the timber rent is captured (GOK 2000; Obukhov 2000;  Shutikov 2000).
2r  In Russian the timber rent is actually called  forest rent (lesnaya renta), although what is meant  is usually the
rent on standing timber.
353.8  The forest revenue distribution key has also been modified, with the newly generated
revenues  being  allocated  partly  to  leskhozy  for  reforestation,  and  partly  to  the  regional
budget.  The initial proposal for a regional forest  fund to develop the forest sector in general
was rejected by industrialists.  Instead,  a proposal  is now tabled for such a regional  fund to
finance forest road building specifically.
3.9  The  normative  cost  methodology  is  now  being  extended  to  the  wood  processing
sector.  Profitability  calculations  for  the  pulp-and-paper,  chip,  plywood  and  sawn  goods
branches have revealed that wood processing is appropriating rent.  The Komi government is
therefore contemplating raising stumpage fees further in order to capture part of this rent. For
example,  in the pulp-and-paper branch,  one proposal  consists  of reducing  the profit margin
from 31% to about 25% by raising stumpage fees by RUB  13 per m3 of round wood.
3.10  Based upon the timber sector experiment, Komi is working  on a draft federal law that
would allow  the region to apply the same methodology  to other resources,  in particular oil.
The  Komi  experiment  is  a premiere  in contemporary  Russia.  It  falls  short  of a revenue-
neutral  shift, since no taxes  have been cut  as a result of the reform. Nevertheless,  it takes  a
step  towards  capturing resource  rents and turning them into public revenue.  The  impact on
the region's forest revenue and overall fiscal position, the reaction of the forest industry (will
firms relocate to neighboring regions?),  etc. will need careful monitoring.  If the reform turns
out to be a success, it might trigger a demonstration effect.
3.11  Of  course,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  hurt  the  sector  when  removing  the  rent.
Capturing the rent should not do away with profits.  In particular,  it could be argued that the
profitability of 13.5%  predicted for the year 2000 may be insufficient.  Admittedly,  one must
keep in mind that profitability figures  generally suffer from gross underestimation  in Russia.
Nevertheless,  the  impact  of the  reform  on  logging  must  be  monitored.  One  must  know
whether timber prices have increased in real terms and find out the elasticity of round wood
prices with respect to stumpage fees. A low elasticity would suggest that round wood prices
are in fact insensitive to stumpage fees, and that the potential for withdrawing the timber rent
is  limited  to  loggers.  It  might  then be  that  the  Syktyvkar  pulp-and-paper  plant  exercises
oligopsony power (it consumes  36% of local  round wood), which  would severely constrain
stumpage  fee reform.  If anything, the reduction  in the profitability of logging indicates that
loggers  have  shouldered  part of the rise in  stumpage  fees  instead of fully passing  it on to
customers.
Northern Territories
3.12  Leaning  in part on Komi's innovative  approach,  the Government  Committee  of the
Russian  Federation  for Northern Affairs,  which  until 2000  handled  questions of economic
development  in the resource-rich northern territories (from Karelia in the west to Chukotka in
the Far East), adopted a resolution to  differentiate  natural resource use payments to develop
the regions'  industrial base (Goskomsev 2000).
36Samara Oblast
3.13  The region of Samara has decided to fill the legal and fiscal vacuum left by Article 41
of the  1992 Russian "Law on Use of the Subsoil,"  which provides that "regular payments for
the right  the  extract  minerals  are  determined  taking  into  account  the  type of mineral,  the
quantity  and  quality  of their  reserves,  the  natural,  geographic,  technical  and  economic
conditions  of their reclamation  and  exploitation  of their  deposit."  Samara  Oblast  has  thus
started differentiating mineral resource user fees to reflect rent-generating factors  and capture
part of the rent. It has implemented  the  6-16%  range set for oil and gas in the legislation  so
that now,  for deposits with  relatively  advantageous  conditions,  fees range  from  12.29%  to
13.14%, while users of relatively disadvantaged  deposits pay only 8-10.43%  (Evteeva 2000).
A Practical Experiment: Novgorod  Oblast
3.14  The forest  sector used to  figure  prominently  among  the  sources of revenues  of this
northwestern region of Russia.  In  1904,  for example,  they represented 26% of total regional
budget  revenues  (Novgorod  Oblast  1965-1976-1986).  This  role  was  dramatically  reduced
with the new  rules  for stumpage  fee  calculation  established  in  1949  as well  as the massive
industrialization  campaign  undertaken  by  Stalin.  By  the  1960s,  the  share  of forestry  in
regional budget revenues had been reduced to less than 5%.  Nowadays,  forest revenues play
an  even  smaller  role.  The share  of natural  resource  user  fees in Novgorod's  consolidated
regional  budget revenues  represented  2.7%  in  1999, with stumpage  fees  accounting  for half
of that.  The  share  of the  whole  forest  sector  in  the  region's  consolidated  tax  revenues  is
estimated at around 5%, or US$ 3.4 million (GNIVTs 2000).
3.15  Eismont et al. have  tried to overcome  the problems of using the net-back method to
estimate the timber rent  in Novgorod  (2001).  As highlighted  above, depending  on the origin
of the  data, the net-back  method can  lead to  serious uncertainties  in the estimation process.
The innovation of Eismout et al. (2001) consists of using timber auction data to estimate the
timber rent econometrically.
3.16  The model assumes  perfect competition among loggers and sets  the rent equal to the
auction price (stumpage fee). The auction price is a function of several explanatory variables:
(1)  timber  type  (coniferous  vs.  deciduous,  with  coniferous  fetching  higher  prices  than
deciduous);  (2) volume per tree  (the higher the volume the higher the price);  and (3) hauling
distance (the smaller the distance the higher the price).
3.17  As a first step, a linear specification is used to estimate the rent:
C=  C  + C2 TYPE +C3  -QUALITY  C  DISTANCE  (4)
where  PA is the  auction price  (stumpage  fee),  and  TYPE is a dummy variable,  representing
timber type (one if coniferous, zero otherwise).  The estimation results are as follows.  Except
for the  constant,  all  of the  estimated  coefficients  are  of the  correct  sign  and  statistically
significant at the 1% level:
37PA = -7.1458 +18.3557  -TYPE + 125.2861 -QUALITY - 0.3187 -DISTANCE
Std. Errors  (14.1155)  (2.5431)  (34.8736)  (0.0927)
t-statistic  (-0.5062)  (7.2177)  (3.5923)  (-3.4373)
3.18  The coefficients suggest  that, ceteris  paribus, coniferous wood is worth RUB 18 more
per cubic meter than  deciduous wood;  as  the volume per tree increases  by one cubic meter,
the price of timber increases  by RUB  125;  and  as the distance  from the  forest plot to  the
market  increases  by one  kilometer,  the  price of timber  declines  by RUB  0.32.  The  forest
authority could use this simple model to set the price of timber sold outside of auctions:  by
entering the parameters of a given cubic meter, the equation will return its price.
3.19  Unfortunately,  logging costs do not appear in the  linear specification,  which is why
the following non-linear specification of the function defining auction price was also used:
PA  =  CI + C2 'TYPE + c3 *  QUALITYC4  -exp(c,  -DISTANCE)  (5)
3.20  Equation  (5) has a clearer economic  interpretation  than (4). The sum of the first two
terms  on the right-hand side  correspond to the market price of timber for  either deciduous
(with  TYPE=O) or  coniferous  (with  TYPE=1) trees.  The  third  term  on  the right-hand  side
stands  for  logging  costs,  which  depend  on  timber  quality  and  hauling  distance.  The
difference between  the market price for timber and logging costs is an approximation of the
rent (stumpage value).
3.21  Estimation  of equation  (5)  under  engineering  values  for  the coefficients  C4  and  C5
(C4 =  0.2644  and  c5 = 0.0043) produced the following results:
PRICE  =178.6845 + 22.2406 -TYPE -102.6373 _  QO.2 6 44  *  e0.0043d
Std. Errors  (29.5923)  (3.1906)  (21.2042)
t-statistic  (6.0382)  (6.9705)  (-4.8404)
3.22  The problem  with this  method  of estimation  is the  stability of the  obtained  results
relative  to  the  variation  of  the  exogenously  given  parameters  c4 and  c5. These  two
coefficients  indeed  vary  with  the  logging  technology  employed.  The  engineering  values
noted  above  are based upon a traditional,  mostly manual,  logging technology,  which is still
prevalent in Russia.  For more mechanized  or fully mechanized technologies,  the coefficients
assume  slightly different  engineering  values.  To assess the robustness of the  estimation one
may  calculate  the  values  of the  coefficients  cl,  c2 and  c3 as  a  function  of different
parameter  values,  e.g.  the  values  given  above  i  50%.  This  procedure  reveals  that  the
estimation may be regarded as robust.
3.23  This  econometric  approach predicts  logging costs well below reported costs, which
may be due to the facts that:  (1) auction prices do not include road building  costs (auctions
concern  short-term felling rights without road-building  obligations); (2)  loggers participating
38in auctions  are more  competitive  than those  who  do not;  and (3)  reported logging  costs  are
artificially bloated to avoid taxation.
3.24  This approach also predicts market prices  for timber well below  actual market prices
(around RUB  200 as opposed to RUB 400).  One reason is that administrative  and marketing
costs have not been taken into account in (5).  Another possible  explanation is the presence of
market  power.  Novgorod  Oblast  counts  as  many  as  300 logging  companies  producing  an
average of only about 7,000 cubic meters per year. These small loggers may find themselves
subject to non-competitive practices by buyers  and intermediaries.  Further research is needed
to determine  the ratio of timber buyers to sellers and test the market power hypothesis.
IV.  SOME POLITICAL ECONOMY DIMENSIONS  OF NATURAL  RESOURCE
RENT TAXATION  IN RUSSIA
Natural Resource Taxation and the Non-Payments  Problem
4.1  Since the end of communism the Russian  economy has been plagued,  in some cases
crippled, by non-payments.  "Non-payments"  refer to financial  obligations not settled in cash
or  not  settled  at  all.  As  the  problem  spread  in  Russia,  the  formal  economy  became
increasingly  cash-strapped.  In-kind payments,  barter  and  a range  of promissory notes  with
low  credibility  and  limited  geographical  recognition  took  over  as  the prevalent  means of
payment, and arrears accumulated,  eventually contributing  to the meltdown of August  1998.
Natural resource  sectors were far from  immune,  indeed they were,  and  arguably still  are,  at
the heart of the non-payments problem.29
4.2  It is the energy sector that played a central role  in the non-payments  story. Over 60%
of the oil produced  in Russia is sold domestically  or in the CIS,  and non-payment problems
existed throughout  this  supply chain.  In addition,  many of the wholesale  transactions  in the
domestic  sector  were  handled  on  a  barter  basis.  Cash  transactions  did  take  place  at  the
gasoline  pump but suppliers  further up the chain  did not access  this cash,  and neither did tax
authorities (Thomson 1998).
4.3  Utilities,  in particular  RAO  UES, the public  electric  monopoly,  and  its network  of
regional subsidiaries  subsidized inefficient  local companies by providing them with cheap or
free electricity.  Since these companies  were not able to pay for their energy bills, ROA UES
had trouble paying its own suppliers (Gazprom,  and oil and coal producers  mainly) and all of
them  failed  to  meet  their tax  obligations  to  the government.  As  a result,  the  state coffers
yearned for cash to support Russia's extensive social safety net (Pinto et al. 2000).
29 In the  forest sector,  one of the  symptoms  was the low collection rate of stumpage  fees.  For example,  in the
Far Eastern region of Khabarovsk, about 63% of forest  fees  were collected in June  1997. This ratio  fell to 36%
in June  1998, time  at which the backlog  in unpaid  forest fees amounted to US$  17  million (Markandya  et al.
1999).
394.4  To  dismantle  the  non-payments  problem,  it  is  key  to  involve  natural  resource
producers,  especially  oil and gas  companies.  By requiring  that they pay their taxes in  cash
and  on  time,  the  government  would  give  them  an  incentive  to  recover  costs  from  their
customers,  in  spite  of regional  and  local  pressures  that  they  abstain  from  doing  so.  In
addition,  by  liberalizing  energy  sales,  in  particular  by  removing  restrictions  on  energy
exports,  the government  would help  clear the  glut on the domestic  market,  thus enhancing
realized  rent.  Part  of the  additional  realized  rent  could  then  be  captured  through  more
effective  rental  payments.  This process would  likely unlock  large  amounts  of cash,  which
could be used, in a more discriminate way than today, to alleviate the social consequences of
full energy cost recovery.
4.5  Under  government pressure,  timely,  in-cash tax payments by oil and gas companies
increased  in  2000,  according  to  the Ministry of Taxation.  Energy suppliers  now  also more
commonly demand that their customers  pay their bills, lest they be  disconnected.  However,
non-payments  are still believed to be rampant.
Fiscal Federalism
4.6  Questions  of resource  ownership  are  traditionally  sensitive  in  Russia.  Land  is  no
exception.  For years now, the federal Duma has been discussing a draft Land Code, whereby
a legal  framework  would be  designed  for the privatization of land.  No significant progress
has  been  made,  and  the  total  amount  of Russian  land  held  in  private  property  is  truly
negligible.
4.7  The  ownership  of natural  resources  is  equally  controversial.  Natural  resource  tax
revenues are shared among the three levels of government in Russia, and natural resource tax
revenue  assignment  is  a  sensitive  matter.  Article  72  of the  Constitution  of the  Russian
Federation  provides  for the joint jurisdiction  of the  federal  government  and its  89 subjects
(members  of the Federation)  over "issues  of the possession,  utilization and  management of
land  and  of  sub-surface,  water  and  other  natural  resources"  and  "administrative,
administrative-procedural,  labor,  family,  housing,  land,  water  and  forest  legislation;
legislation on subsurface resources  and on environmental protection."  The Constitution thus
remains vague on who has authority with respect to possession, utilization  and management.
Not  surprisingly,  the federal  and sub-national  governments  often disagree  on how  to  share
the fiscal revenues from natural  resources (McLure  1994; McLure et al. 1996).  For instance,
in 1997-1998,  the governors of the regions of Karelia and Khabarovsk  challenged the federal
ownership of forests before the Supreme Court, but lost.
4.8  The  contention  over  sharing  natural resource  tax  revenues  also  has  to do  with  the
regional  concentration  of these  resources.  Most  oil  and  gas  production  is  located  in  two
autonomous  regions (Khanty-Mansi  and  Yamalo-Nenets).  About three-fourths  of all metal
production originate from 10 regions. Natural resource revenues  are thus highly concentrated
in a small number of  regions.  For instance,  in 1997 the three regions best endowed in natural
resources  collected  47%  of the sum  of regional  revenues  from taxes,  fees  and  charges  on
natural resources  (Klotsvog and Kushnikova  1998; USGTAT  1998a).
404.9  The  literature  on  fiscal  federalism  has  touched  upon  the  assignrment  of natural
resource tax revenues.  Generally speaking,  arguments  in favor of assigning revenues  to the
federal  government  include:  (1)  regional  revenue  stability;  (2)  allocative  efficiency;  (3)
horizontal  equity;  and  (4)  the  communal  property  of the natural  resource  heritage.  On the
other  hand,  arguments  in  favor  of assignment  to  sub-national  governments  include:  (1)
compensating  for the negative externalities  suffered locally due to resource exploitation;  (2)
the  local  heritage  of  natural  resources;  and  (3)  the  prevention  of  secession  from  the
Federation because of fiscal abuse (McLure  1'994; McLure  et al. 1996; USGTAT  1998b).
4.10  Table  19  shows  how  the  revenues  collected  from  some  natural  resource  and
environmental taxes are supposed to be shared among the various levels of government.
Table  19. Statutory Assignment of Selected Natural Resource Revenues in Russia
(in percentage)
User fee type  Federal  Regional  Local share
share  share
Subsoil user fees  (oil and gas)  40  30  30
Subsoil user fees (other than oil and gas)  25  25  50
Subsoil water user fees  40  60  0
Oil excises  100  0  0
Gas excises  100  0  0
Oil replacement fee a  20 (100)  20 (0)  0
Forest user fees b  40  60  0 (100)
Surface water user fees  40  60  0
Aquatic biological resource user fees c  100  0  0
Pollution charges  d  19  27  54
Water supply, sewage and treatment  e  0  0  100
Land taxes and rentals  30  20  50
a)  20%  to  the  federal  fund  for  mineral  base replacement  and  20%  to the  regional  fund  for mineral  base
replacement.  The remaining  60% stays  in the company conducting  exploration activities,  depending  on the
clauses of the ad hoc agreement  with the Ministry of Natural Resources. If the company does not conduct
such activities itself,  100%  flow to the federal fund for mineral base replacement.
b)  The breakdown  corresponds to the revenues  from minimal stumpage  fees.  Excess  stumnpage  fees  accrue  to
the local leskhozy.
c)  The  receipts  are  sent  to  the  federal  fund  for the  management,  research,  protection  and  reproduction  of
biological resources.
d)  Divided  into  general  budget  revenues  and  earmarked  budgetary  environmental  funds:  the  federal  share
breaks  down into  10%  to the  federal budget  and  9% to the  federal environmental  fund;  the regional  and
local shares accrue to the regional and local environmental  funds, respectively.
e)  All proceeds  go to municipal water utilities for cost recovery.
Sources: East West Institute (1999);  GOR (1996);  IFEI (1998);  Roskoshnaya  (2000);  Summers (2000);  Titova
(2000); USGTAT (1998a); Ezhov (2000).
414.11  It is interesting to note that of those categories,  only four (subsoil user fees, pollution
charges  and land payments)  are shared across the three levels. Three  categories (oil and gas
excises and aquatic  biological  resource  user fees)  flow to the federal level  exclusively.  One
category  (water  supply,  sewage  and  wastewater  treatment  fees)  accrues  to  the local  level
only.
4.12  These are statutory, not actual rates, however. As Table 20 indicates, actual data show
greater  shares  staying  at  the regional  and local  levels,  as regions  and municipalities  often
resent remitting all the revenues due to the federal budget.
Table 20. Actual Revenue Sharing Among Levels of Government (1998)
Federal  Regional  Local  Total
RUB  %  RUB  %  RUB  %  RUB  %
bn.  Share  bn.  Share  bn.  Share  bn.  Share
CPT  35  38  36  39  21  23  93  100
PIT  0  0  26  37  44  62  71  100
VAT  105  67  33  21  19  12  156  100
Excises  52  77  12  17  4  6  68  100
Property tax  0  0  23  49  24  51  47  100
"Green taxes"  3  14  9  41  10  45  23  100
Foreign trade taxes  37  100  0  0  0  0  37  100
Othertaxes  4  8  14  30  30  63  48  100
Total tax revenues  236  44  154  28  153  28  542  100
Non-tax revenues  40  45  14  43  10  12  64  100
Budget funds  26  59  18  41  0  0  44  100
Total revenues  302  46  186  29  163  25  650  100
Source: USGTAT (1998a).
4.13  In contrast to  Table  19,  which  indicated  that the law mandates  regions to direct the
larger share of natural resource tax revenues to the federal government,  Table 21  shows that
regions  and  municipalities  instead  retained  as  much  as  86%  in  1998.  With respect  to  the
impact of fiscal  federalism  on the  feasibility of a  shift to rental  payments, two main  issues
arise.  First, would regions raise the tax burden on natural resources if they knew they would
have  to relinquish  part of the resulting  revenues to Moscow?  As  Table 20  suggested,  sub-
national  governments  do end up retaining the bulk of natural resource revenues.  Second  and
more importantly, could Russia, as a federation, sustain a tax  system relying more heavily on
natural resources? Revenue disparity across regions is at the heart of the problem.
4.14  A shift from capital  and labor taxes to rental payments  could be criticized because it
risks  heightening  regional  revenue  disparity.  The  argument  would  go  as  follows.  First,
natural  resource  endowments  vary  greatly  across  regions,  so  that  resource-poor  regions
would find it hard to sustain themselves on natural resource revenues.  Second, regions remit
relatively  smaller shares  of their natural  resource  tax  revenues  to  the  federal  budget  than
other  tax  revenues.  Not  only  do  sub-national  governments  retain  a  larger  share  of the
42revenues than the  federal  government,  they fail to remit even the statutory federal  share,  as
Table  20 revealed.  So,  if the  share  of natural  resource  taxes  increases,  the federal  budget
would be expected to suffer some losses.
4.15  The first argument  is flawed.  In Russia, natural resource tax revenues per capita are
highly  correlated  with  non-natural  resource  tax  revenues  per  capita.  The  correlation
coefficient  was  0.906 in  1997 (USGTAT  1998b).  In other words, resource-poor  regions find
it hard to sustain themselves  with high or low reliance  on natural resource taxes because they
do  not have  a  solid  tax  base.  The  shift  does  not make  matters  any  worse.  Interregional
subsidies  are currently needed to help poor regions and would still be needed after the role of
natural resource taxes has been enhanced.
4.16  As  to  the  second  risk,  it  is real  but can  mitigated.  Greater  centralization  of natural
resource revenues,  and redistribution  of the revenues  on a needs basis, may be necessary to
make  the natural  resource  taxation  reform  sustainable  in  a  federal  context.  This is  in  fact
what  the Putin  administration  is proposing  to do by  federalizing  a  greater proportion of the
natural  resources  not  equally  distributed  across  regions  (essentially  hydrocarbons  and
precious metals):  "the basic federal taxes should be:  customs  duties, the VAT,  excise taxes
(paid  by business  firms),  the  federal  profit  tax  (corporate  income  tax  on  enterprises  and
organizations),  the personal income tax, payments for use of natural resources which are not
uniformly  distributed  (above  all  for extraction  of raw hydrocarbons  and  other  raw material
resources  for  export),  and  federal  licensing  and  registration  fees."  (GOR  2000,  162)30  In
addition, unlocking the rent would inject more cash into the state's finances, only a portion of
which would be retained by the region. The federal governiment  could therefore witness a net
inflow of revenues.
A Hypothetical Example: Timber Rent Tax Reform
4.17  This section envisions the potential response to increased taxation of rent grounded in
the  withdrawal  of the timber rent.  This  simple political analysis  gives some insight into the
future  of natural  resource  tax  reform,  in  particular  by  trying  to  identify  the  political
constituency  at  the  federal,  regional  and  local  level.  At  least  10  different  types  of
stakeholders can be distinguished, including the three levels of government  (federal, regional
and local),  the  three  branches  of authority of the  Forest  Service,  the three  main  groups  of
protagonists  in the forest industry  (loggers, processors and vertically integrated  companies),
and  traders.  All stakeholders  are interested  in forest  rents, though for different reasons.  For
simplicity purposes, we  assume that increases  in rental payments  would materialize through
increases in stumpage fees.
3O The  distinction  between  "uniformly  distributed"  and  unevenly  distributed  natural  resources  is  somewhat
artificial  since  the  disparity in natural  resource  endowment  is not just  driven  by the  absolute  quantities  of
resource  reserves, but also by the inherent value (rent) of those reserves,  which  is itself a function of quantity,
quality and distance  to market. Siberia, for example,  is well endowed in timber and fossil fuels, but the distance
to the market raises costs tremendously,  so that it may not be economically  feasible to exploit the corresponding
endowments.
434.18  Table  21  attempts  to  summarize  the  expected  reactions  to  the proposed  tax  shift,
deconstructing  the response  for each measure making up the policy package.  Each measure
(A through I) is scored based upon the response expected from each stakeholder.
Table 21. Predicted Initial Responses to Timber Rent Tax Reform
Forest Service  Administration  Forest industry
- o0  X  - 0  X  o  .)
v  X4  v  X  I  > 
Measure proposed  C  .,,  )  r  o,  -o
A  Better definition of  +  +  +  +  +  +  ?
forest costs
B  Better knowledge  +  +  +  +  +  +  ?  ?  ?  ?
of forests
C  Better use of forests  +  +  +  +  +  +  ?  ?  ?  ?
D  Moretransparent  +  ?  ?  +  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
forest auctions
E  Regulation of  +  ?  ?  +  ?  ?  +  ?
timber oligopsony
F  Limit leskhozy to  +  ?  - +  ?  ?  +  +  +  ?
management
G  Differentiate  ?  ?
stumpage fees
H  Forest revenue  ?  +  +  +  +  +  +
recycling
Earmark for forest  +  +  +  +
management
TOTALSCORE  7  4  3  6  3  3  2  -1  -2  -2
* VIC means vertically integrated company.
"+" means favorable  and equals +  1;  "-" means unfavorable  and equals -1;  "?" means  difficult to predict and
equals 0.
4.19  Each measure receives a score between  1 (well received) and -1 (rejected).  Scores are
then totalled per stakeholder.  A total  score of +9 suggests  that the  stakeholder  accepts  all
measures;  -9  means  the  stakeholder  is  opposed  to  all  measures.  The  measures  are  the
following: (A) to better define forest costs, i.e. to know more accurately how much it costs to
produce timber depending on local conditions.  Once costs are known with greater certainty,
stumpage  rates  can also be set more precisely; (B)  to develop  a better knowledge of forests
implies  better  inventories  of timber  and  non-timber  resources,  so  that  sellers  and  buyers
ascertain more accurately the value of the standing plot to be logged;  (C)  to improve the use
of  forests  means,  inter  alia, putting  up  for  sale  the  most  appropriate  timber  plots,
encouraging  more rational logging, etc.; (D) making forest auctions more transparent means
44making them more competitive,  so that the rent is more properly revealed and captured;  (E)
regulating  the  timber  oligopsony  means  curbing  the  market  power  possibly  exercised  by
wood processors and intermediaries  in the forest business.  The objective is to ensure greater
competition  and openness  in market relations;  (F)  leskhozy  need to  limit their  activities to
their core function of forest management  and refrain from carrying out commercial activities;
(G)  stumpage  fees  need  to  be  differentiated  to better  reflect  site-specific  rent-generating
conditions;  (H)  recycling  means  that the revenues  of higher  stumpage  fees will be used to
reduce  taxes  on  capital  and  labor;  (I)  revenues  could  be  earmarked,  i.e.  reserved  for
investments and expenditures  on forest management and environmental protection.
4.20  The  Federal Forest Service  (FFS)31 favors  all  measures  fostering  better  forest
management.  It would oppose the use of forest revenues for other purposes than forestry.  The
earmarking proposal would certainly be well received.
4.21  The regional branch of the Forest Service (RFS)  should look  favorably at  improved
forest management.  Its position is less clear regarding the regulation of wood markets,  as it
may have  a  vested  interest in non-transparency  and market  distortions.  The  RFS,  may be
divided on forest revenue recycling.
4.22  For reasons  similar  to  those  invoked  for  the RFS,  the  reaction  of the  leskhozy  is
expected to be positive on the aspects of forest management,  but less predictable with respect
to market  regulation.  Their reaction  should be negative  on the question  whether to confine
leskhozy  in  their  legally  defined  function  of forest  management.  Of all  actors,  leskhozy
should  the  most  favorable  to  increases  in  stumpage  fees,  since  the  1997  Forest  Code
mandates  that all revenues  above  minimal  stumpage  rates be  directed  to leskhozy.  They are
expected to oppose the recycling of those additional forest revenues.
4.23  The federal administration should  look  favorably  upon  all  the measures  proposed,
with the possible exception  of revenue  recycling  and the exception  of earmarking  revenues
for forest management.  The Ministry of Finance,  for example,  might think  it wiser to let the
additional forest revenue swell the federal coffers.
4.24  Similarly  to  the  RFS,  the  regional administration will likely react  positively  to the
proposed improvements  in forest management.  It would be equally ambivalent regarding  the
proposed  market  regulation.  In  contrast  to  the  RFS  and  the  federal  administration,  the
regional  administration  would  be  divided  on  the issue  of a  raise  in  stumpage  fees.  Since
increased  stumpage  fees  mean  additional  revenues  and  possibly  also  a more  competitive
timber market, the regional administration  should favor increases  in stumpage fees. However,
it is also concerned  to  develop  the regional  forestry sector by attracting  new investors.  The
regional  administration  should  support  forest revenue  recycling  to  cut taxes  on capital  and
labor.
31  The FFS was placed  under the  authority of the Ministry of Natural  Resources  in May 2000.  Environmental
organizations  have voiced  their  concern that the  Ministry of Natural Resources  will promote  a more intensive
use of natural resources, including timber, perhaps at the expense of environmental protection.
454.25  The local administration  reacts as the regional administration.
4.26  Logging firms would not welcome the tightening in forestry cost accounting if these
rules  hurt  their  profitability.  They  should  be  indifferent  to  improvements  in  forest
management,  favorable  to  measures  designed  to  curb  oligopsonistic  power  in the  timber
market,  hostile  to  increases  in  stumpage  fees,  favorable  to  forest  revenue  recycling
(especially  if recycling  helps reduce  their tax burden),  and  favorable  to  earmarking  as  this
helps ensure long-term supplies of raw materials.
4.27  Wood processors would  react in a way similar to loggers, except on the question of
oligopsony regulation,  as some processing firms benefit from oligopsony.
4.28  Vertically integrated  companies (VIC)  combine the functions  of logging, processing
and sometimes  also trading.  They will respond positively  to the  confinement  of leskhozy  in
forest management  and to  forest revenue recycling but negatively  to proposals hurting their
profitability.
4.29  Wood traders should generally  be hostile to the measured designed  to capture  some
of the rent currently appropriated by traders.  They would welcome  revenue  recycling.  They
should be indifferent  to changes  in cost accounting rules, though this could ultimately have
an effect on market prices as well.
Volatility of Commodity Prices
4.30  The  feasibility  of a  natural  tax  reform  must  be  considered  in  the  context  of the
volatility of primary commodity  prices.  The price  of oil,  to name but one  commodity,  has
varied greatly over the past two years alone,  rising from US$  10 to US$  30 a barrel.  Russia,
as an oil exporter, has greatly benefited  from this rise through additional export earnings and
export  tax revenues.  In  times of high world market  prices,  the rent of natural  resources  is
high, heightening the potential of rent capture.  On the contrary, when prices are low, excess
profits are also lower, and so is the ability of the government to extract more rent.
4.31  This  has  important  implications  for  a  revenue  system in which the  share  of rental
payments  is expected  to  grow and gradually  replace taxes  on labor and  capital. Among the
qualities  of a  good  tax  system  is  a  stable  level  of revenues.  Since  resource  rent can  vary
significantly  in  the course  of time,  and the  government  is mostly powerless  in the face  of
fluctuations  in international  commodity prices, it is unlikely that rent should replace  all other
sources  of revenues  in any given  economy.  However,  further research  would be needed  to
compare  the relative stability of rent and income to determine where the fluctuations  are the
smallest.
4.32  Moreover,  the rent on land is not the same as the rent on resources.  Land rent shows
greater  stability over time than resource  rent, as it is more closely associated with economic
growth and perhaps  less affected by international cycles.  This suggests that a land tax should
generally  be  contemplated  as  a way  to  finance  a shift towards  natural resource  taxes.  The
difficulty of applying this approach to Russia is the lack of a land market to reveal the rent.
464.33  Even though taxing resource rents would not suffice to provide revenue stability, this
realization should not deter the government  from assessing resource  rent and taking steps to
capture it when it is positive.  Stability of revenues requires diversifying revenue sources and
efficiency in resource allocation requires removing  tax distortions.  A balance must be struck
between these two potentially conflicting objectives.
V.  CONCLUSION
5.1  Despite their importance  in the Russian  economy, natural resources  do not contribute
as  much  as  they  should  to  public  revenues  and  private  interests  appropriate  significant
resource  rents.  Several  natural  resource  taxes  are  set  regardless  of  market  prices  or
production  costs.  Such  taxes  favor  profitable  deposits  and  penalize  marginal  ones.  The
natural resource sector supplies a large  amount of revenues to the budget, but mostly through
taxes  on  the  value  that is  added  to  natural  resources,  not  the  value,  i.e.  rent,  of resources
themselves.
5.2  The appropriated  rent  on crude  oil,  natural  gas  and standing  timber  was estimated.
What  was  estimated  was  the  current  average  rent.  Through  rent  should  theoretically  be
estimated  in an intertemporal  framework,  the data necessary  to carry out such an analysis, in
particular  reliable  discount  and  inflation  rates  and  marginal  cost  and  revenue  stream
estimates,  were not available.  Auction  data, which  could help measure  and collect  the rent,
were  equally  absent,  except  in  the  case  of timber  in  Novgorod  Oblast.  For  the  other
estimations,  the method consisted of netting out costs from commodity prices.
5.3  The sum of appropriated  rents on oil  and natural gas alone represented about  18%  of
consolidated tax revenues in  1999. In other words, if the appropriated rent on oil and gas had
been captured by the government, all taxes at the federal, regional  and municipal levels could
have been cut by 18%.
5.4  The current tax reform explicitly aims to reduce the tax burden on capital  and labor so
as  to  stimulate  investment  and  employment.  Green  tax  shifting  would  help  realize  these
objectives  without  running  a  budget  deficit.  The  Putin  Administration  seems  aware  that
natural  resources  are  inadequately  taxed  and  has proposed  that  the  public  finance  role  of
rental  payments  should be  enhanced  and  these payments  should  be differentiated  according
to the objective conditions.
5.5  Failure to  tax  away the rent  negatively  affects  the  economy  in  several  ways.  First,
public  revenues  must  be raised  elsewhere,  i.e.  on  capital  and  labor.  Most taxes  discourage
what  is  being  taxed.  Capital  taxes  discourage  investments  and  labor  taxes  discourage
employment.  Investment and employment are exactly what should be stimulated to foster the
reorganization of the Russian economy. As long as rents remain insufficiently taxed, resource
extraction  will  continue  to  attract  resources  that  could  otherwise  be allocated  to  activities
with  higher  value  added  and  greater  labor  intensity,  such  as  manufacturing  and  services.
47Russia has indeed suffered  from the Dutch  disease  since it began its transition to  a market
economy. The exports of primary commodities, in particular oil and gas, increased, while the
domestic  production  of  tradable  goods,  in  particular  agriculture,  plummeted.  With
overvalued  real  exchange  rates propped up by massive  capital  inflows,  the consumption  of
imported  goods rose  at  the  expense  of domestic  production.  This reallocation  of factors  of
production was also  associated  with higher income inequality,  since the income of resource
extraction  and  spin-offs  as  financial  services  is  concentrated  in  a  small  fraction  of the
population (Gelb 2001).
5.6  Second,  it  is unlikely  that the  rent appropriated  is reinvested  in productive  capital,
which  is  a  requirement  for  sustainable  development.  For  example,  Russians  keep  huge
holdings of US  dollars  at  home  and  abroad through  capital  flight.  In the short term,  these
liquid assets do not return to the Russian economy.
5.7  Third, the  failure  to  capture  more  rent  causes  a monetary imbalance.  With high oil
prices, large amounts of foreign exchange are earned. The legislation obliges oil exporters to
sell  75% of their  earnings  to the  Central  Bank.  For the  Central  Bank to buy this  foreign
currency,  it prints rubles. Thus, it increases the money supply and risks fueling inflation.  One
proposal to sterilize this increase in the money supply is for the Ministry of Finance to pay its
debt  to  the  Central  Bank.  Another  one  is  to  allocate  higher  oil  export  tax  revenues  to  a
budgetary  fund earmarked  for enterprise  reorganization  (World Bank 2000b).  Alternatively,
windfall revenues could be used to cut traditional taxes.
5.8  There is a variety of ways in which economic rent can be captured, including auctions
and taxes. Competitive auctions allow to measure and collect the rent. However,  auctions are
still  undeveloped  in  Russia.  They need  to be  encouraged  and  made  more  transparent.  In
parallel, taxes still need to be used, in particular  differentiated requited payments.  Insofar as
differentiated  requited  payments  capture  rent  and  create  incentives  for  better  resource
management,  they should be privileged  over unrequited payments.  For example, profit taxes
do not guarantee  stable revenues to the government in light of poor accounting and auditing.
They  incite  firms to  conceal  revenues  and bloat costs,  in particular  labor costs,  in order to
minimize  taxes.  As  a  result,  the  govermnent  is  at  risk  of receiving  little  revenue  from
resource ownership  (Conrad and Shalizi  1988;  Conrad et al. 1990;  Nellor and Sunley 1994).
For their part, export duties distort resource allocation. As accounting and auditing improves,
the  government  should be  able  to rely increasingly  on pure  resource  rent taxes.  If such  a
system were  ushered  in  immediately,  however,  the risk of profit  concealment  by resource
producing  firms  would  be  serious.  An  additional  advantage  of requited  over  unrequited
payments  is that Russian regions  are generally  entitled to  increasing the  former but not the
latter.  In particular, regions are authorized to raise (and lower) user fees.
5.9  A well-differentiated  system of resource user fees requires  site-specific  information,
which  in the  case  of Russia represents  significant  challenges.  The  administrative  costs  of
such a system  could be high  and administrative  abuse is possible, but the alternative  is the
current  system,  which  also  contains  arbitrary  elements  and  generates  little  revenue.
Moreover,  the  current legislation for capturing  rent, which includes  oil royalties  and timber
48stumpage  fees,  does  provide  for proper differentiation.  Building  upon  the  existing  system
instead of afresh is an additional advantage of using requited payments in Russia.
5.10  Among  requited  payments,  user  fees  should  be  used  rather than  property  taxes.  In
addition  to being more  adequate  from  an  ecological  perspective  (certain  resource uses,  not
the resources  themselves,  are  the  bads  to be  discouraged),  user  fees  obviate  the  ownership
question.  This is precious,  especially in light of the tribulations of the new  federal Land Tax
code and other arduous questions of resource ownership.
5.11  Once  the rent is captured,  the  state  could  use  it to cut the tax  burden  on labor  and
capital,  and  possibly  investing  it  in  public  programs.  The  Russian  or  Soviet  state  has
traditionally been the principal investor in the economy,  with very mixed records judging by
market  economy  standards.  Rent  could also  be  consumed,  but this would conflict  with the
rule  that  all  rents  on  exhaustible  resources  should  be  reinvested  in  human  and  machine
capital in order  to maintain  future  income  levels.  Eventually,  even the  appropriated  rent  is
reinvested, but the question is to know how.  It is only legitimate to expect that a social good
should retain its social value. The accumulation of private assets with little or no social return
would not qualify as appropriate reinvestment  of the rent.
5.12  There  is little doubt that the  socialization of rent would meet a barrage  of opposition
from  influential  interests  currently  appropriating  the  rent.  Nevertheless,  it is  the  collective
welfare of the present and future Russian generations that is at stake..
49ANNEXES
Prices and Costs in the Oil Extracting Industry
(US$/ton)
1999  2000
No transfer  Transfer No transfer  Transfer
pricing  pricing  prcing  pricing
Export share (of oil extracted)  37.5%  37.5%  39.0%  39.0%
Sales price  110.5  110.5  177.9  177.9
Export duty  4.8  4.8  20.9  20.9
Customs fee  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2
Transportation to export gate  13.7  13.7  14.2  14.2
Border price a  91.9  91.9  142.6  142.6
Share of domestic and CIS sales (of
oil extracted)  62.5%  62.5%  61.0%  61.0%
Domestic sales price b  44.5  27.1  67.1  37.4
Average price for tax estimation  62.2  27.1  96.5  37.4
Oil excise  2.2  2.2  2.0  2.0
Average price for tax estimation  d  60.0  24.9  94.6  35.4
Subsoil user fee (royalty)  5.2  2.1  8.1  3.0
Mineral replacement  fee  6.0  2.5  9.5  3.5
Road tax  1.6  0.6  2.5  0.9
Labor (including auxiliary personnel)  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.2
Depreciation  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.4
Production costs  e  6.2  6.2  6.8  6.8
Payroll taxes to extra-budgetary
funds  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2
Housing tax  1.0  0.6  1.5  0.9
Other taxes  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.5
Gross profit  32.9  5.6  58.6  12.9
Profit tax  8.3  5.0  14.3  8.2
Capital investments  (excl. mineral
replacement fee)  7.6  7.6  13.5  13.5
a)  Delivered at frontier,  i.e. export gate.
b)  Delivered at the junction between  local producer's  and main pipelines, before VAT.
c)  Excluding VAT, tariffs and transportation.
d)  Excluding VAT, tariffs,  excises and transportation.
e)  Except labor costs, taxes and depreciation.
Source: IFEI (2000).




Use for enterprises'  own needs  11.4%
Share of domestic  sales  57.9%
Wholesale price  9.80
VAT  1.63
Gas excise  1.22
Price without taxes  6.94
Share of exports  30.7%
Border price  62.24
International transport (abroad)  10.20
Export duties  2.60
Gas excise  14.83
Price without taxes  34.61
Net proceeds from sales  14.63
Transportation  cost  2.19
including labor  0.30
depreciation  0.62
Production cost  0.91
including labor  0.10
depreciation  0.33
Marketing  costs  0.03
including labor  0.02
depreciation  0.00
Gas purchase from independent producers  0.11
Social security contributions  0.16
Road tax  0.48
Housing tax  0.29
Property tax  0.24
Price used by Gazprom in transfers  to subsidiaries  1.94
Subsoil user fee (royalty)  0.29
Mineral replacement  fee (VSMB)  0.19
Other taxes on subsoil use  0.05
Profit on sales  9.81
Profit tax  0.84
Capital investments (excluding VSMB)  4.90
Source: IFEI (2000).Oil Extraction in Russia
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b,issna  ui  IsOAJuH  'Oqw!,I00zEstimates of Timber Rent in Selected Russian Regions - Equity Technique
(US$/m)
Regions  Arkhangelsk  Khabarovsk  Krasnoyarsk  Leningrad  Moscow  Novgorod  Pskov  Vologda
Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.
Revenues  (CIF price)  16.7  37.9  31.1  72.2  28.0  120.2  16.9  25.6  16.9  26.0  22.3  35.8  20.6  32.5  16.2  24.0
Cost of sales  10.8  17.8  22.6  59.0  30.3  75.3  11.5  17.0  12.5  15.4  18.3  28.4  12.0  14.1  13.1  18.7
Nornal profit*  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6
Tax take (notional)  2.7  8.8  3.0  7.0  1.2  19.4  3.8  6.2  2.3  5.5  2.1  6.3  4.7  9.2  1.5  3.3
Appropriated rent  1.6  9.6  3.9  4.6  -5.1  23.9  0.0  0.8  0.5  3.5  0.3  -0.5  2.3  7.5  0.0  0.3
Weighted average rent  2.0  4.3  3.6  0.3  0.9  0.0  3.4  0.0
Foregone revenues (US$  21.5  22.2  28.0  1.6  0.5  0.1  4.1  0.2
mn/yr)
NIPIElLesprom  Arkhangelsk  Khabarovsk  Krasnoyarsk  Leningrad  Moscow  Novgorod  Pskov  Vologda
Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.
Revenues (CIF price)  16.7  37.9  31.1  72.2  28.0  120.2  16.9  25.6  16.9  26.0  22.3  35.8  20.6  32.5  16.2  24.0
Costofsales  11.4  18.3  11.8  48.1  13.5  58.6  5.6  11.1  10.4  13.3  8.2  18.3  5.0  7.1  8.9  14.5
Normal profit*  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6
Tax take (notional)  1.6  7.7  5.8  9.8  4.3  23.2  3.4  5.7  1.9  5.1  4.2  7.0  4.7  9.2  2.2  4.0
Appropriated rent  2.1  10.1  11.9  12.6  8.5  36.8  6.3  7.1  2.9  5.9  8.3  8.8  9.3  14.5  3.5  3.8
Weighted  average rent  2.5  12.3  17.0  6.6  3.3  8.5  10.3  3.5
Foregone revenues (US$  26.9  63.2  131.9  32.5  2.0  26.4  12.6  30.0
mn/yr)
Dom= Domestic;  Exp= Export.
Sources:  Arkhangelsk  forest committee  (regional  average);  Khabarovskii  Krai  administration  (regional  average);  Krasnoyarskii  Krai  forest committee  (based
upon 2 firms);  Leningrad  Oblast forest industry comnmittee (regional  average); Moscow:  VIPKLKh (regional  average); Novgorod: Novgorodlesprom  (based upon
several firms); Pskov forest commnittee  (based upon 1 firm); NIPIElLesprom.
55Estimates of Timber Rent in Selected Russian Regions - Costs Technique
(US$/m3)
Regions  Arkhangelsk  Khabarovsk  Krasnoyarsk  Leningrad  Moscow  Novgorod  Pskov  Vologda
Donm  Exp.  Donm  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.
Revenues (CIF price)  16.7  37.9  31.1  72.2  28.0  120.2  16.9  25.6  16.9  26.0  22.3  35.8  20.6  32.5  16.2  24.0
Cost of sales  10.8  17.8  22.6  59.0  30.3  75.3  11.5  17.0  12.5  15.4  18.3  28.4  12.0  14.1  13.1  18.7
Normal profit*  1.0  1.0  3.0  3.0  3.7  3.7  1.4  1.4  0.9  0.9  2.0  2.0  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.3
Tax take (notional)  2.7  8.8  3.0  7.0  1.2  19.4  3.8  6.2  2.3  5.5  2.1  6.3  4.7  9.2  1.5  3.3
Appropriated rent  2.3  10.3  2.6  3.2  -7.1  21.8  0.2  1.1  1.2  4.2  0.0  -0.9  2.8  8.0  0.3  0.6
Weighted average rent  2.7  2.9  1.5  0.6  1.6  -0.3  3.8  0.3
Foregone revenues  28.6  15.1  12.0  3.0  1.0  -0.9  4.7  2.6
(US$ mn/yr)
NIPIEILesprom  Arkhangelsk  Khabarovsk  Krasnoyarsk  Leningrad  Moscow  Novgorod  Pskov  Vologda
Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Donm  Exp.  Donm  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.  Dom.  Exp.
Revenues  (CIF price)  16.7  37.9  31.1  72.2  28.0  120.2  16.9  25.6  16.9  26.0  22.3  35.8  20.6  32.5  16.2  24.0
Cost of sales  11.4  18.3  11.8  48.1  13.5  58.6  5.6  11.1  10.4  13.3  8.2  18.3  5.0  7.1  8.9  14.5
Normal profit*  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.4  1.2  1.2  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.7
Tax take (notional)  1.6  7.7  5.8  9.8  4.3  23.2  3.4  5.7  1.9  5.1  4.2  7.0  4.7  9.2  2.2  4.0
Appropriated rent  2.7  10.7  12.2  12.8  9.0  37.3  7.4  8.3  3.9  6.9  9.5  10.0  10.8  16.0  4.4  4.7
Weighted average rent  3.1  12.6  17.5  7.8  4.3  9.7  11.8  4.4
Foregone revenues  33.1  64.5  135.3  38.1  2.6  30.1  14.4  37.7
(US$ mn/yr)
Dom= Domestic; Exp= Export.
Sources:  Arkhangelsk  forest committee  (regional average);  Khabarovskii Krai  administration  (regional average);  Krasnoyarskii  Krai  forest committee  (based
upon 2 firms); Leningrad Oblast forest industry committee (regional average); Moscow:  VIPKLKh (regional average); Novgorod: Novgorodlesprom  (based upon
several firms); Pskov forest committee (based upon I firm); NIPlEILesprom
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